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This thesis examines the Coast Guard's current
compliance-oriented inspections and considers Total Quality
Management (TQM) as an alternative control mechanism aboard
the Coast Guard's High Endurance Cutters. This comparative
analysis is based on a review of applicable literature and
data gained through field interviews.
The Coast Guard's use of an overlay structure to increase
innovation is analyzed. Research on parallel learning
structures suggests that guestions remain about the impact
such structures may have on transforming Coast Guard culture.
A comparative analysis is used to weigh the merits of
compliance systems and the self-control mechanisms of The
Quality Advantage, the Coast Guard variant of TQM. A basic
model of control serves as a framework for comparison.
Significant differences in philosophy, control processes and
results are noted. The major goals of organizational
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Recent changes in Coast Guard logistics and management
practices suggest a reassessment of the Coast Guard's control
mechanisms. These changes include the implementation of a
centralized logistics program at the unit level and a Coast
Guard-wide turn towards Total Quality Management.
This thesis examines the Coast Guard's current compliance-
oriented inspections and considers Total Quality Management
(TQM) as an alternative control mechanism aboard the Coast
Guard's High Endurance Cutters.
B . BACKGROUND
In the mid-1980s, the Coast Guard implemented a
centralized supply system (CSS) aboard its High Endurance
Cutters 1 with a view towards improving logistical support.
CSS would, in part, respond to growing concerns of poor
shipboard inventory management and other logistical
inefficiencies. Historically, the Coast Guard has depended on
compliance inspections to ensure that its units were following
supply policies and procedures. The present standard
compliance checklists, however, do not reflect CSS changes.
'The Coast Guard's larger ships are known as High Endurance
Cutters (HECs) and as 378s, a reference to their length.
As a result, the 378s' new supply management practices have
gone uninspected since their implementation in 1988.
In 1990, the Commandant of the Coast Guard announced that
Total Quality Management (TQM) , which advocates participative
management, would help chart the course towards improved
effectiveness. Given this shift in command philosophy, an
opportunity presents itself to evaluate the two alternative
control systems for CSS cutters: external control through




What are the merits of TQM and compliance-oriented inspections
as control systems for effective CSS operations?
Secondary Research Questions:
1. What is the current state of compliance inspections
aboard CSS cutters?
2. How could TQM support a self-control mechanism aboard
CSS vessels?
3. What happens to the current inspection organization if
the Coast Guard adopts a self-control mechanism?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
The research focuses on the similarities and
differences of the management control systems offered by TQM
and compliance inspections. CSS requirements, found in the
Coast Guard Afloat Supply Procedures Manual (ASPM) , serve as
the baseline for this comparison. The analysis includes an
evaluation of each system's advantages and disadvantages based
on data gathered through interviews of Coast Guard personnel.
After considering the different management tools suggested by
the two approaches, recommendations are offered. This thesis
does not provide an actual evaluation of a CSS cutter but
provides a comparative analysis of two approaches towards
control.
2. Limitations
A true comparison is difficult to make since TQM
processes have not actually been applied on Coast Guard
cutters. The analysis takes the theory and data gathered from
the interviews to assess the merits of compliance inspections.
This information is compared against applicable TQM theory and
some insightful interview data about current Coast Guard self-
control methods. CSS procedures are being implemented without
being checked by compliance inspections. This approach,
though not deliberate, has contributed to an environment of
innovativeness and self-control. This environment is similar
to one a Total Quality approach to control would hope to
create: one of innovativeness anchored by internal control
mechanisms. Our comparative analysis, while not weighing the
consequences of two active, different control systems,
provides valid information regarding the merits of these
systems to the Coast Guard.
Some of the 378s' operational schedules limited the
research. Their underway periods prevented the interviewing
of personnel assigned to the deployed cutters. The reduced
number of interviewees, however, did not significantly impact
the findings given the consistency of results.
3. Assumptions
Several assumptions underlie the thesis research:
1. The Coast Guard has a long term commitment to Total
Quality Management.
2. The Executive Steering Committee and Quality
Management Boards will actively support change in the
oversight function.
3. TQM applications, now limited to Coast Guard shore
facilities, will formally include cutters in the future.
4. Crew size and rank structure on board 378s will
remain the same as presently configured.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Each chapter represents a major element of research.
Chapter I introduces the research's purpose and methodology.
Chapter II provides background information that highlights the
underlying issues central to control of the HEC logistics
program. Chapter III describes the Coast Guard's TQM
organization and its procedures. Chapter IV presents a review
of the pertinent literature, including basic theory of
control, theoretical applications of compliance-oriented and
preventative control systems, and a description of parallel
organizations. Chapter V presents and analyzes the data
collected from the field interviews. Chapter VI offers an
analysis of the two control systems and the implications they
have for logistics planning and control. Chapter VII presents
recommendations and conclusions concerning this research
effort. Finally, several appendices provide information
useful to the reader. For example, Appendix A contains a list
of frequently used abbreviations.
F . METHODS
The research included a review of pertinent literature
associated with both TQM and compliance-oriented control
systems. This review focused on the characteristics of both
internal and external control systems and associated
management techniques. By understanding the salient features
of each system, a more thorough analysis of the Coast Guard's
efforts is possible.
The researchers opted to use qualitative interviews versus
quantitative questionnaires because of the exploratory nature
of the thesis. Free-flowinq interviews would provide the
subjective data about the participants' full ranqe of
reactions to current and alternative control practices. The
interviews were also meant to provide insiqht into local
control and improvement practices on board 378' cutters.
The researchers selected interview questions by using
brainstorming and multi-voting techniques. Primary questions
had to meet certain criteria to be chosen: (1) open-ended in
nature and (2) reflective of the primary and secondary thesis
questions (previously listed in section C of this chapter)
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Appendix B contains a list of the final interview
questions. The list is split into two major sections:
compliance inspections and TQM-related matters. Each major
section is then divided into two sub-parts: primary questions
and secondary questions. The primary questions were designed
to invite a free-flowing discussion where the respondent would
address the more specific issues listed in the secondary
questions. The secondary questions served as a checklist for
the interviewers, who could focus the respondent on a specific
topic if the discussion started to wander.
The interview subjects included shipboard personnel and
policy makers up the logistics chain-of-command. By asking
the questions at various levels in the command structure, the
researchers hoped to determine how the different positions
within the system viewed control. Interviewees aboard 378s
included supply representatives (supply officers, assistant
supply officers and storeroom supervisors) and command-level
personnel (commanding officers, executive officers and
engineering officers) . Supply department representatives
accounted for 17 interviews. There were nine command-level
interviews. Off-ship interviewees included compliance team
members, Maintenance and Logistics Command (MLC)
representatives (logistics branch chief and ship support
division members) , and policy makers at the headquarters level
(ELM branch chief, assistant branch chief, and policy analysis
division members) . These off-ship interviews accounted for 14
of the 4 total interviews conducted.
The interviews were conducted in person, and when
necessary, by telephone. Before the interview began, the
respondent was given a brief overview of the research's scope
and was told of the researchers' commitment to the
confidentiality of all responses. Interviews lasted
approximately one to one and one-half hours. Both researchers
participated in the interviews. One researcher primarily
asked the questions, while the other wrote down the responses.
Both interviewers, however, were free to interject follow-up
questions or to ask for points of clarification. As a means
to improve the interview process, interviewees were asked to
provide feedback as to the appropriateness and validity of
questions.
The following chapters present the background, theory and
interview data pertinent to control. By understanding the
scope, assumptions, limitations and methods that guided this
research, the reader can better evaluate our conclusions and
recommendations about control systems aboard the Coast Guard's
High Endurance Cutters.
II. BACKGROUND
Chapter I offered an explanation of why a comparative
analysis of alternative control systems is timely. This
chapter provides background information that illuminates why
the comparison is also topical. The background information
reveals the strategic connection between the logistics system
and unit readiness. The Coast Guard either strengthens or
weakens this link when it puts in place a system to control
its logistics functions. The background information,
therefore, also serves as a backdrop for the comparative
analysis. This information reflects conditions that the Coast
Guard must consider when designing its control mechanisms. By
understanding these conditions, the reader can better weigh
our conclusions and recommendations about the Coast Guard's
choices for control.
Chapter II begins with a discussion of Centralized Supply,
its reasons for implementation, and its present status. The
chapter then describes the Coast Guard's inspection system and
its ability to control and improve the logistics system.
A. CENTRALIZED SUPPLY ABOARD 378' CUTTERS
1. Reasons for Centralized Supply Implementation
In 1988, the Coast Guard implemented the centralized
supply system on board its 378' cutters. Headquarters
established this program to resolve longstanding support
problems, such as poor shipboard inventory management and
inaccurate ship configuration baselines. The intent of CSS is
to formalize the connection between logistics and readiness.
The following presents some background to the implementation
of CSS.
The Coast Guard is a relatively small, mission-
oriented public service. To live up to its official motto,
"Semper Paratus" (Always Ready) , the Coast Guard adopted an
unofficial philosophy of mission first, support matters
second. As the Coast Guard began to feel the hidden costs of
such an attitude, it commissioned the Logistics Management
Institute (LMI) to study the Coast Guard's internal supply
system. LMI's study noted "two fundamental decision keys
characterize the Coast Guard's management style: (1) invest in
the supply support system only as much as necessary to cover
the current problem, and (2) rely heavily on the Commanding
Officer's initiative to overcome shortfalls in supply support
when they occur." (LMI, 1988, p. 5) LMI reported that this
management style encouraged supply inefficiencies.
10
A 1988 LMI study identified a raft of support issues
facing the pre-CSS logistics organization.
Deficiencies in Coast Guard shipboard supply management
are apparent in many ways: reguired parts and supplies are
not in stock, while unnecessary items occupy storeroom
space; emergency local purchase and local scrounging are
freguently necessary; maintenance officers and technicians
must spend an inordinate time procuring repair parts and
spares; guantities in allowance documents are not trusted;
overbuying takes place and creates excess stocks; fund
shortages cause delays in replenishment of needed items;
and eguipment/eguipage validations indicate notable
differences from recorded information. (LMI, 1987, p. 1-4)
The ailing logistics system was causing significant problems
in readiness and sustainability.
The Coast Guard's organizational structure also
reduced supply responsiveness. The structural design
encouraged a fragmentary and piece-meal approach to supply
support. The LMI study pointed out that each functional
division at Headguarters handled its own logistics issues.
Engineering, weapons and electronics divisions were
independent, commodity-support representatives to the fleet.
Each division made decisions about maintenance and support
issues for their particular eguipment and eguipage. They
devised logistics plans and issued support procedures to their
functional counterparts on the HECs. This commodity advocacy
led to each shipboard department managing its own spare parts
inventory. (LMI, 1987, p. A-2)
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This vertical, decentralized approach towards
shipboard supply led to many support shortfalls.
• The shipboard commodity managers were more interested in
maintenance tasks vice supply responsibilities.
• Separate departmental inventories limited visibility of
duplicate spare parts and lost usage data. It also
increased inventory losses and pilferage due to easier
access.
• The various departments repeated their supply tasks so
infrequently that they lost learning curve efficiencies.
• There was no focal point on board the vessel to be sure
that configuration and allowance documentation were
promptly and properly updated. Therefore, allowance lists
did not reflect equipment updates.
• Local purchases increased to fill "emergency" requirements
due to poor, departmental inventory practices.
• Unneeded allowance items occupied valuable storage space.
• The various departments viewed supply tasks as having
little impact on the ship's mission. Tasks, such as spot
inventories, stock record maintenance, financial
accounting and supply analysis, went undone. (LMI, 1987,
p. A3-A4)
Other external factors also influenced the Coast
Guard's decision to centralize the shipboard supply functions.
The fragmented nature of the pre-CSS logistics system
prevented proper strategic planning. Also, the financially
austere and operationally more complicated future called for
a more responsive supply system.
More expensive and complex spares and repair parts for new
high-technology equipment installed on ships require
earlier, more extensive planning for initial provisioning,
procurement, and stock replenishment. Ships spending
longer periods away from home port and procurement rules
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that are more restrictive make local purchase a less
frequent option for obtaining material. Audit and
inspection reports on supply support are critical of
current means for shipboard allowance management, material
accountability, and supply system effectiveness. Ships
entering extended overhaul or modernization are found to
be carrying large amounts of excess or outdated spares and
repair parts. (LMI, 1987, p. iii)
2. Changing to a Centralized Supply System
To resolve its logistics problems, the Coast Guard
centralized the shipboard supply functions. Headquarters
hoped to reverse the deteriorating supply situation by
changing the shipboard organization and strengthening its
policies and procedures. The Headquarters Logistics
Management Division (ELM) , a branch of the larger Engineering
offices, formalized the important connection between logistics
and readiness. ELM pulled together disparate supply policies
and procedures into one directive, the ASPM. They designed
the document to increase supply support across the fleet by
creating mandatory procedures and setting stricter performance
standards.
The HEC shipboard organization changed to reflect the
increased importance of supply-related issues. Supply
manpower and capability grew with the addition of a lieutenant
Supply Officer billet and two additional storekeeper billets.
The supply officer became responsible for the newly
consolidated departmental inventories. Beyond its previous
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duties, the supply department was now responsible for all
inventory management requirements: determining demand,
maintaining allowances, and storing and issuing parts. The
new Afloat Supply Procedures Manual reflected significant
changes in policy and procedures. Other major innovations in
supply policy included setting mandatory allowance levels for
spare parts and instituting a stricter configuration reporting
system.
Headquarters identified the anticipated advantages
that CSS would offer over the old system.
• Supply and parts availability for the maintenance program
would improve because of the inventories' consolidation
under one department.
• The ship would record better usage history, and support
levels above the ship would receive more accurate demand
data.
• A single department with visibility of all material would
improve inventory practices: stocking to mandatory
allowance levels and eliminating duplicate items and
unnecessary back orders.
• Departments would incur expenses at the time they receive
material which would better reflect and support a
performance-oriented budgeting system.
• Technicians would have more time to perform maintenance
because of the more efficient use of supply personnel.
• A single point of control would better manage shipboard
equipment, equipage, and property.
• The supply department would be responsible for control and
reporting of shipboard configuration change reports. It
would also maintain temporary postings to configuration
records. (LMI, 1987, pp. 3-2 - 3-8)
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When faced with the old system's myriad problems, headquarters
decided that CSS offered significant opportunities for short-
term relief and long-term improvements. ELM hoped that the
new regulations and the cutters' additional manpower and
expertise would provide quick improvements to previously
mismanaged inventory systems. In the long-term, headquarters
expected to change the mind-set that encouraged non-responsive
logistics planning and execution. ELM hoped to convince the
system's participants of the significant impact of logistics
in readiness issues. CSS's short-term accomplishments would
affirm this importance to the senior officers. The future
senior officer corps, embodied in recently appointed supply
officers, their peers and subordinates, would take their CSS
experiences and apply them in their future billets.
3. Status of CSS Program
CSS's introduction to the fleet coincided with each
ship's departure from an extended shipyard period. When a
ship left FRAM (Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization) , its
storeroom inventories were to reflect its allowance documents
and critical machinery was to be in working order.
Unfortunately, many of the 378s exited FRAM with inaccurate
inventories, insufficient general supplies and a work list of
broken equipment. CSS, therefore, started at a less than
auspicious time. Technicians, concerned with fixing
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equipment, resisted the new, unfamiliar CSS procedures.
Storekeepers had to service their customers ' current demands
while simultaneously trying to correct allowance and inventory
deficiencies.
A 1990 logistics conference, sponsored by ELM,
documented these and other CSS growing pains. Round table
discussions among HEC supply officers, assistant supply
officers, and MLC and ELM representatives discussed many CSS
and FRAM-related problems. Untrained storekeepers greeted
centralized supply as additional, and often incomprehensible,
work. CSS's intended customers, the engineers and other
technicians, received it with skepticism and resistance. They
saw CSS as an invasion of turf, an additional burden of
unfamiliar paperwork, and an effort to exert administrative
control over their technical experience. The ASPM was
unwieldy, confusing and unclear. It did not adequately define
the roles and responsibilities up and down the logistics
chain-of-command. The computer software designed to execute
CSS was ineffective and impeded rather than aided its
implementation. The result: supply officers either altered
or ignored CSS policy and procedures to meet their missions.
(Commandant [G-ELM] LTR, March 1990)
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Since its implementation in 1988, CSS has evolved with
very little management oversight. Though ELM made some
changes in policy and procedures as a result of the first
logistics conference, many of the same problems continue to
plague the system today. In March 1992, a second Afloat
Logistics Workshop documented CSS ' s lingering troubles. The
ships listed their concerns in point papers requested by MLC
and ELM. Appendix C contains a summary of these point papers.
Significant, recalcitrant problems include poor policy and
procedural guidance, a deficient configuration baseline,
unsupportive automation, and inadequate shore side support
(MLC Pacific, 1992)
.
The net result of four years without a coordinated and
systematic effort in implementing centralized supply is that,
today, there are 12 HECs operating with 12 different versions
of CSS. The Coast Guard must consider its options to control
its supply system. The Coast Guard has historically depended
on external compliance inspections to provide procedural
uniformity. TQM, however, provides the Coast Guard with
another management option, self-control at the unit level.
Whatever the mechanism, it should identify systemic problems
and improve shipboard procedures on a continuous basis.
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B. CURRENT COAST GUARD CONTROL MECHANISMS
1. Inspections
The Coast Guard has depended on compliance inspections
to fulfill several needs. They determine conformance with
federal laws, set a standard of unit and individual
performance, and certify effective unit management.
Inspections are a review of a command's administrative
performance. Special items of interest include: personnel
management, operations, human resource programs, and supply
and fiscal management.
The Maintenance Logistics Commands are responsible for
inspecting the 378s under their administrative control. About
six weeks before the inspection, the MLC inspection staff
sends the unit check-off sheets, which outline mandated
procedures. The unit uses these lists to self-inspect before
the inspection team arrives. The team consists of technical
experts who check their respective specialty areas.
Inspectors go beyond the scope of the checklists when
significant problems arise in any area. Upon conclusion of
the inspection, the team briefs the CO and files a formal
report to the ship's superiors, the MLC and Area Commanders.
Since their exit from FRAM, many of the 378s have gone
long periods without an inspection. Until recently, under-
staffing and under-funding have hampered the full execution of
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the MLC inspection mission. The lack of inspections has
encouraged the growth of diverging supply systems across the
HEC fleet. Furthermore, current inspections do not determine
shipboard compliance with CSS reguirements. They only examine
commercial purchases and cashier accountability. They fail to
check inventory practices, configuration management, and
maintenance of mandatory allowances.
Headguarters (ELM) identified billets and funded the
creation of CSS oversight teams. The team members reported to
the MLCs for duty this past summer. These people are not
members of the regular MLC inspection team. They are located
in the Logistics Division on the West Coast and in the Vessels
Section on the East Coast. Confusion exists about their
mandate. While there is interest in compliance checks, the
team members feel their duties include training, familiarizing
shipboard personnel with ASPM procedures, and identifying
policy and procedural shortfalls. To date, the Pacific MLC
team has trained only one vessel. This ship had recently
implemented CSS and most of its crew members had not received
any ASPM training prior to the team's visit. This singular
case does not present enough information to determine the
value of this type of oversight visit. Whether these teams
will introduce procedural uniformity to the system is unknown.
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2. Personnel Evaluations
While not the focus of this study, personnel
evaluations also serve as a means to control the Coast Guard's
supply system. The Coast Guard relies on its members to
follow the policies and procedures outlined in its official
documents. Knowing that the quality of individual efforts
differ, the Coast Guard uses its evaluation systems to
regulate performance. The enlisted and officer evaluation
systems help maintain a level of competence in the fleet.
Daily oversight by the ship's supply officer should
guarantee compliance with CSS requirements. If the supply
officer's skills, aptitude, or attitude are deficient,
however, then system compliance diminishes. Likewise, if the
supply officer's supervisor has little or no supply
experience, oversight by top shipboard management decreases.
In such cases the supervisor may only detect those failures
that impact directly on unit performance. The supervisor will
not catch problems dealing with system efficiencies or
economies. While personnel evaluations may play a role in
workplace motivation, they may be limited in their ability to
control shipboard supply processes.
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C. SUMMARY
The Coast Guard, being such a small service, must use its
limited resources wisely. The earlier problems of poor
inventory management and fragmented logistics planning
required systemic changes in shipboard supply support. CSS
was the response to this need. Unfortunately, it began as the
378s were exiting FRAM, thus diminishing, if not negating, the
improvements it promised.
By instituting CSS, headquarters changed shipboard
organizations, policies and procedures. It did not, however,
make a commensurate change in the supply system's control
mechanism. Compliance inspections have only recently reached
HEC vessels, and even then, they do not evaluate CSS
procedures. TQM's rise as the management tool-of-choice in
the Coast Guard may offer some suggestions for an improved
control system. Whatever the resulting mechanism, the Coast
Guard must institute some form of control over its CSS system
or, possibly, re-experience the problems of the past.
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III. THE QUALITY ADVANTAGE
The Coast Guard's move toward Total Quality Management has
definite implications for its control systems. The
philosophies associated with TQM are radically different from
those that support compliance-based control. TQM advocates a
customer-driven, process-oriented mechanism while compliance
inspections promote a management-driven, product-oriented
system. This chapter provides the background information
necessary to understand the possible ramifications of adopting
a TQM philosophy.
Rather than reviewing various TQM models, Chapter III
introduces the reader to the Coast Guard's variant, The
Quality Advantage, or TQA. Chapter III begins with a look at
why the Coast Guard turned toward TQA as a means to improve
its overall efficiency. The chapter then discusses TQA's
guiding principles, its associated management structures, and
its processes for continuous improvement.
A. BACKGROUND
In 1990, the commandant wrote to senior Coast Guard
officials about his desire to improve the service's
performance. "I believe we need to adopt a guality philosophy
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toward continuous improvement as a long-term servicewide goal
directed from the top." (Kime, 1990) Such a philosophy would
allow the Coast Guard to respond more effectively to growing
regulatory demands and tighter budgets. At a Flag Conference
that same year, he and other flag officers developed a TQM
charter, which served as the basis for future TQM efforts.
In late-1990, the Coast Guard hired Organizational
Dynamics, Inc. (ODI) , a consulting firm dealing in guality
management. ODI introduced the Coast Guard to a version of
TQM called The Quality Advantage (TQA) . This eclectic blend
of management ideas and methods rests on five elements called
"Pillars of Quality." Organizational values of honesty,
commitment to customer satisfaction and commitment to self-
improvement are the foundations of TQA's Pillars. (Williams,
1991, p. 7)
1. TQM Defined
While training manuals label the philosophy and theory
as TQA, various Commandant Instructions continue to use TQM
interchangeably with TQA. The Coast Guard defines TQM as "a
strategic, coordinated management system for achieving
customer satisfaction that involves all managers and employees
and uses quantitative methods to continuously improve an
organization's processes. "(COMDTINST 5224.7, 1991, (encl) p. 1)
The organizational instruction further describes TQM as "both
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a philosophy and a set of skills for managing and improving
work." This philosophy has two basic principles:
• Focus on the process as the key to producing and
delivering quality products and services, and
• Achieve customer (internal and external) satisfaction and
exceed their expectations. (COMDTINST 5224.7, 1991, p. 2)
2. Coast Guard Commitment to TQM
Often, actions speak louder than words. The Coast
Guard has committed itself to significant innovations to
secure TQM's promised advantages. It has adopted a relatively
new management structure, an overlay organization, to enhance
its creativity. The Coast Guard has also created a computer
network to enhance organizational connectivity and increase
communications flow through out the chain of command.
The Coast Guard's TQM Training Plan also reveals a
high level of support. Successful implementation required a
critical mass of 2000 trained personnel. After receiving
initial training from ODI, the Coast Guard organized its own
training center to be sure that follow-on instruction would be
available.
Each of the Coast Guard's ten geographic districts
have begun using TQM at their shore-side facilities. There is
little TQM activity, however, aboard Coast Guard cutters.
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This lack of TQM aboard ships is understandable since initial
TQM training and other activities focused on shore commands.
(Commandant (CCS), 1991, p. 2)
The Coast Guard's vision statement reveals a definite
sign of its commitment to TQM. It begins, "The United States
Coast Guard is committed to continuous improvement of its
performance as the world's leading maritime humanitarian and
safety organization. . ." Continuous improvement is a TQM
cornerstone. Its prominent place in the first line of the
vision statement underscores the extent of top management's
dedication to improvement. Vice-Admiral Daniell, the Vice-
Commandant of the Coast Guard, summarized TQM's mandate at a
1991 conference.
• TQM is the wave of the future for the Coast Guard.
• TQM allows us to address the anxiety of rapid change and
complex choices we face.
• TQM continually challenges the way we do things. Does the
old way still make sense?
• TQM is here to stay - it's not a drill, fad or experiment.
• TQM will cost money and time, and we are prepared to make
this investment. The commandant decided to proceed with
TQM after much thought and study - TQM was not an
accidental choice. (Bulletin, March 1991, p. 26)
B. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Organizational values of honesty, commitment to customer
satisfaction and to self-improvement are the ideals upon which
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TQA rests. In turn, these values support TQA's five Pillars
of Quality. Figure 1, on the following page, shows these
pillars to be Customer Focus, Total Involvement, Measurement,
Systematic Support, and Continuous Improvement. ODI describes
each pillar as critical to a structurally sound TQA approach.
(ODI, 1989, p. 8) By understanding TQA's philosophical
foundation, a clear distinction can be drawn between
compliance control systems and a Total Quality approach. To
address these distinctions, the implications of each TQA
principle to Coast Guard management and control practices are
briefly discussed.
1. Customer Focus
To satisfy customers, workers and management must
understand their customers' reguirements. Daily processes
link individuals to their internal customers and suppliers.
TQA insists that by responding to internal customers' needs,
the final product will satisfy the external customers'
reguirements. Everyone in an organization is both a customer
and a supplier. That is, everyone involved in the process
receives or gives information, material or services to someone
else within the organization. External customers receive a
better, higher-guality product if everyone within the process


















Figure 1 Pillars of Quality
TQA, however, both internal and external customers are able to
have input into process design.
2. Total Involvement
Quality is not just the responsibility of management
or the guality control team. Everyone in the organization has
an obligation to instill quality in their work. Management
must empower its workers. In the pursuit of quality,
management should give its workers control over the workshop
processes. The workers, consequently, must not look to
management or the inspection team to check for quality. They
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must hold themselves responsible for their efforts. Moreover,
both management and workers must work together to look for
ways to improve the system's chances for quality.
This new philosophy challenges the Coast Guard's
mentality of managerial responsibility. Currently,
headquarter units formulate and enforce policy. The Coast
Guard has tried to instill quality through its inspection
programs. TQA calls for everyone in the organization to be
involved with policy formulation and quality control, not just
top management and their inspection teams.
3
. Measurement
Monitoring quality is a central precept of TQA.
You cannot manage what you cannot measure. You cannot
measure what you cannot operationally define. You cannot
operationally define what you do not understand. . .You will
not succeed if you do not measure. (Sink, 1989, p. 74)
Careful measurement of processes is critical to effective long
term improvement and error prevention. Goals for quality are
essential. They provide a baseline against which management
can compare process measurements. TQA believes that customer
requirements should define the quality goals.
Coast Guard inspections are designed to look at the
end product, a paper trail indicating procedures have been
followed. TQA moves beyond document-checking to an on-going,
statistical measurement of processes. TQA insists that
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quality increases by monitoring processes not through after-
the-fact inspections of products.
4. Systematic Support
Though TQA has a participative philosophy, management
plays a key role in achieving the organization's quality
goals. The organization's top level decides how to design its
management systems. These, in turn, impact system and
individual performance. How an organization plans, budgets,
monitors and rewards performance impacts directly on the
system's products. Management systems, therefore, should
reflect the organization's commitment to quality.
The Coast Guard's current control system does not
support a Total Quality objective of process improvement.
Compliance checklists and the inspections themselves indicate
a concern more for individual accountability than for process
correction. This philosophy affects how individuals and units
perform their duties. TQA requires policy makers to carefully
consider whether current management systems support a quality
organization.
5. Continuous Improvement
The ability to seek process improvements is dependent
on an understanding of customer needs. A system that
encourages good internal customer-supplier relationships will
be more innovative and, thus, more responsive to external
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customer requirements. Individuals, and the system itself,
must support efforts that prevent repeat, controllable errors.
By controlling these types of mistakes, time and money are
available for more work or finding improvements to the system.
This idea of constant process review is different from
Coast Guard inspection practices. Headquarter units conduct
unit inspections on an annual or biennial basis. These
infrequent inspections create great leaps in improvement
rather than the steady, continuous improvement advocated by
TQA.
C. TQA MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES
In an attempt to construct its own pillars of quality, the
Coast Guard has created a parallel organization. This
structure serves as a mechanism that lets the formal
organization slowly inculcate TQA's guiding principles while
increasing its ability to adapt and innovate. The following
section explains why the Coast Guard feels it needs another
organization to increase its adaptation skills. It also
introduces the reader to the implications that such a
structure poses.
1. Parallel Management Structure
TQA/TQM's goals are radically different from that of
inspections. TQM aims to improve quality by focusing on work
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processes rather than by inspecting end products. TQM strives
to achieve customer satisfaction rather than compel simple
rule-following. To support this change in basic philosophy,
the Coast Guard has decided to introduce TQM through a
management overlay structure.
The Coast Guard needs to create a parallel organization
which will be an overlay on the existing organization.
The existing organization structure exists to carry out
the mission—to get work done. The TQM organization we
are about to create—staffed by existing personnel—will
exist to improve the work processes through which we
deliver services to our customers. . .no reorganization will
be necessary to carry out TQM... The TQM organizational
overlay links all parts of the Coast Guard vertically and
horizontally ... it reinforces our chain-of-command. . . It
will also allow us to control and to coordinate the
improvement activities of our people. (COMDTINST 5224.7,
1991 p. 2)
The Coast Guard Implementation Team effectively
declared the regular organization unable to deliver guality
improvements or to concentrate sufficiently on issues of
customer satisfaction. The overlay structure, however, should
not take on an organizational life of its own. It should
emphasize, instead, the importance of quality to the existing
organization. The Coast Guard's implementing instruction
states, "A new organizational structure or shadow organization
is not desirable. The goal is to change the way we do
business, not to add a new layer of bureaucracy." (COMDTINST
5224.7, 1991, (end) p. 13)
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Whether this goal is achievable is an important
question when considering the implications of this new
structure. If an organization's members do not commit to
TQA's philosophy, then they will most likely consider the
overlay structure's activities as additional, bureaucratic red
tape. Another question is whether parallel and formal
organizations can co-exist. The transformational impact of
parallel structures on organizational culture may be more than
top management is willing to endure. For example, military
organizations invest very heavily in maintaining formal lines
of authority and communication. Parallel structures diffuse
authority and communication. In the Coast Guard's case,
Headquarters must decide if it is willing to ease its control
over decision-making in favor of increased innovation through
power sharing. Parallel structures pose serious questions for
control mechanisms. The answers to these difficult questions
are unknown; however, this research is meant to delineate the
alternatives as clearly as possible.
2. Overlay Organizational Elements
TQA tries to increase worker participation in
decision-making processes. To encourage this inclusive
approach, the overlay structure uses new organizational
elements that parallel the Coast Guard's regular management
structure. The elements include the Coast Guard Quality
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Council (CGQC), Executive Steering Committee (ESC), Quality
Management Board (QMB)
,
Quality Action Team (QAT) , and Natural
Working Group (NWG)
.
a. Coast Guard Quality Council (CGQC)
The CGQC is the highest level TQM group in the
Coast Guard. Its members include only the highest ranking
admirals at Headquarters and at the Area commands. This
council is responsible for defining TQM and developing its
policies. It sets strategic goals, provides resources,
defines quality indicators, and sponsors QATs as required.
(COMDTINST 5224.7, 1991, (end) p. 2)
b. Executive Steering Committee (ESC)
The ESC is also a top management council. Each
major command (i.e., Headquarters, Areas, MLCs and Districts)
has one ESC to oversee its TQM efforts. The ESC provides
direction and resources to the QMBs that it has chartered. It
identifies internal and external customers. It targets those
cross-program issues that most impact critical customer
requirements. It assesses QMB recommendations and action
plans for effectiveness and value. It informs all process
owners of lessons learned through TQM efforts. (COMDTINST
5224.7, 1991, (end) p. 3)
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c. Quality Management Board (QMB)
QMBs are permanent structures whose members include
cross-functional managers responsible for a range of
processes. ESCs may charter as many QMBs as it has regular
organizational departments. This element of the overlay
structure corresponds to the divisions found in major
geographical commands (i.e., Headquarters, Districts, MLCs and
Areas) . By establishing a QMB within each department, the QMB
can focus on issues affecting that division's specific
customers.
QMBs conduct most of the TQM efforts. They may
charter, however, temporary QATs to aid in data collection and
analysis. QMBs consider ESC-assigned issues. It uses TQM
procedures to identify and analyze a problem. (A later
section discusses these procedures in greater detail.) It
removes obstacles to continuous improvement. If the QMB has
the authority, it makes process changes and then checks
performance to assess the impact of those changes. It shares
its lessons learned and standardizes its successes within its
own sphere of influence. (COMDTINST 5224.7, 1991, (encl) p. 5-6)
d. Quality Action Team (QAT)
As stated before, QATs are temporary groups called
to consider intricate problems. These problems concern
"process issues or opportunities for exploitation that are
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important to analyze and that are often cross-functional,
multi-level and interdisciplinary .
"
(COMDTINST 5224.7, 1991,
(encl) p. 8) The QAT consists of three to seven people who
have first-hand knowledge of the process in question. As
such, QAT members may represent any level of command as long
as they have the requisite knowledge of the process in
question. The QAT uses TQM procedures to conduct its data
collection and analysis. It makes action recommendations to
its chartering QMB and then disbands.
e. Natural Working Group (NWG)
These groups are the basic elements of every Coast
Guard unit. They consist of an individual and the people with
whom that individual usually works. This group is an ongoing
entity that should examine every work process for improvement.
It would use the TQM procedures to collect and analyze data to
determine if its processes are in control. NWGs should bring
significant improvement issues to the attention of its regular
or TQM chain-of-command to increase success standardization.
NWGs are different from QATs in that NWGs are
permanent groups brought together by the nature of their job.
As such, NWGs deal with the wide-range of workshop processes
or, if it desires, a specific issue. QATs, on the other hand,
are comprised of people who are selected for their ability to
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represent different constituencies. QATs are temporary groups
that are more focused since their charters are defined by
their QMB.
3 . Linking structure
Figure 2 presents the overlay organization as a
linking structure. The triangles
represent different management
levels within the Coast Guard.
The marked areas represent the
points of interaction at various
levels in the structure. This
parallel organization allows
• horizontal linkage by having
different working group
members serve together on
cross-functional teams.
• vertical linkage by having a Figure 2 Coast Guard TQM
member of a higher group serve Linking Structure
as chairperson of the next
lower group. (COMDTINST
5224.7, 1991 p. 3)
An example of the overlay structure would show the ESC
in the uppermost triangle. The second triangle would include
the members of the QMB. The leader of the QMB would be a
member of the ESC, thus providing vertical linkage. The lower
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triangles would be QATs. The QATs • team leaders are members
of the QMB, thus providing horizontal linkage within the
organization.
4. Advantages of the Overlay structure
The primary advantage of this structure is its ability
to link various levels of command with each other. This
formalized interaction leads to additional advantages.
• Horizontal linkage enables QMB members to coordinate
efforts across organizational boundaries.
• Vertical linkage enhances goal alignment and communication
flow up and down the chain-of-command.
• By the departments working toward the same goals, cross-
purpose efforts decrease.
• It fosters teamwork and lessens internal competition.
• It improves standardization of improvements. Solutions
from one group may be applicable to other sectors of the
Coast Guard. (COMDTINST 5224.7, 1991, p. 2-4)
D. TQA'S FADE PROCESSES
The principle method for problem solving is Focus,
Analyze, Develop and Execute (FADE) . The goal is not only to
correct the problem but to prevent it from happening again.
This process is a group effort involving all team members who
are considering a particular issue. As Figure 3 shows, the
process consists of four phases: Focus, Analyze, Develop, and
Execute. Each phase has its own goals, tools for analysis and
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end products.
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options and reached Figure 3 FADE Processes
an optimal
decision. Then the organization executes the team's plan and
checks its impact. FADE is an iterative process. The impact
of the team's first Execute phase often leads to the Focus
phase of the second iteration. In this way, FADE promotes a
continuous improvement process.
1. Focus
This phase's goal is to define the problem. TQA
defines a problem as "a situation that is different from what
is wanted." (ODI Handbook, 1990, p. 7) Three steps move the
team toward this end. First, the team generates a list of
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problems. Second, it selects the problem that presents the
greatest opportunity for improvement. Third, the team
verifies and defines the situation in a written statement.
To complete these steps, the team uses several tools.
These include brainstorming, multi-voting technigues, a
selection grid, and impact analysis. Brainstorming is a free-
flowing discussion of ideas. This technigue "encourages
tolerance and creativity as people build upon each other's
ideas." (ODI Handbook, 1990, p. 10) Multi-voting technigues
and a selection grid allow the team to choose and focus on one
alternative. The impact analysis describes why the
organization should improve the situation. It also validates
the team's concentration on that specific case and serves to
focus the team's future efforts. (ODI Handbook, 1990)
2. Analyze
This phase has two goals: to gather baseline data and
to determine the critical factors affecting the situation.
The team takes three steps to accomplish these goals. The
team first decides what it needs to know about the defined
problem. Then, it collects data and sets performance
baselines. With this information, the team picks out the
significant factors. This measurement/analysis phase is
critical. It enables the team to identify the problem's root
causes and to seek permanent improvements to the system. (ODI
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Handbook, 1990) The use of objective data helps eliminate
"gut feeling" determinations of systemic problems.
The tools used to complete this stage include many
methods used in the Focus phase. Additional tools involve
checklists, a data-gathering plan, various statistical
sampling technigues, and analysis aids. Pareto charts and
fishbone diagrams help the team to deduce the reasons for the
problem. A Pareto chart is a bar chart that shows, by
distribution, the incidence of problem causes in various
categories. A fishbone diagram is a schematic presentation of
the factors influencing a given situation. By gathering data
and analyzing it, the team can objectively determine the most
significant element of the problem.
3. Develop
Once the team has identified what it believes are the
significant factors, the Develop phase begins. This phase has
two goals: (1) find a solution to the problem and (2) arrive
at a plan for implementation. There are three steps in this
phase to accomplish the goals. After generating a list of
possible solutions, the team picks one and then develops an
implementation plan. The solution ideally resolves the
immediate situation and prevents a recurrence of the original
problem. It should also produce benefits that are worth the
time, cost and effort reguired to fix the problem. To be
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successful, the plan should consider if there is enough
support to see it brought to conclusion.
This phase uses several new tools. They include
innovation transfer, cost-benefit analysis, force-field
analysis, and written plans and procedures. Innovation
transfer helps generate a potential solutions list by applying
solutions from other situations to the one under study. Cost-
benefit analysis considers the financial ramifications of
particular solutions. Force-field analysis helps the team
understand the forces that may help or hinder the plan's
implementation thus assessing expected levels of support.
Written plans and procedures help the team to visualize their
solution. They also set organizational accountability for
specific actions and outline departures from past procedures.
(ODI Handbook, 1990)
4 . Execute
The Execute phase is the final phase in the FADE
process. At this stage, the team is looking for an
organizational commitment for their plan. Once support is in
place, the organization executes the plan and then makes a
record of its impact. "While earlier phases required
flexibility and new ways of thinking, [this phase] requires
dedicated action to execute the decisions that have been
made." (ODI Handbook, 1990, p. 10) Commitment should be
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inherent to the FADE process. Ideally, the team consisted of
the people committed to the prospect of change. These include
the workers involved with the affected process, people outside
the process who could promote or obstruct the plan, and,
possibly, external customers.
The team has a self-interest in the plan's execution.
The group should use their previously written plans and
procedures as a blueprint to carry out the change. Once the
plan is in effect, the team uses its previously defined
measures of effectiveness to gauge the plan's impact.
Tools to gain commitment include personal bids by team
members to gain political support, group presentations,
statistical sampling, and specifications and control limits.
Appeals to groups and key individuals may be necessary to
assure long term support for the proposed change. Sampling,
specifications and control limits allow the team to check to
see how far actual events deviate from expected results. This
ongoing feedback can also encourage continued commitment as
individuals track the progress of the execute phase.
E. SUMMARY
The Coast Guard views TQA as the management method that
best meets its needs for continuous improvement. The Quality
Advantage relies on values of trust, honesty and a desire to
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perform at personal-best levels. These values form the
underpinnings of a management structure focused on the
customer and continuous systemic improvement. Management and
worker support, as well as effective performance measurements,
are critical for innovation and improvement.
The Coast Guard has adopted a strategy that calls for the
creation of an overlay organization. This structure parallels
the regular organizational structure but encourages
participative management and the flow of ideas through out the
organization. This design hopes to increase innovation,
enhance customer-supplier relationships and institutionalize
successful improvements throughout the organization.
The FADE process identifies problems, generates solutions
and then observes the system after the plan's implementation.
Focus, Analyze, Design, and Execute are phases in TQA's
improvement cycle. This iterative process encourages worker
participation and concentrates heavily on data-gathering,
analysis, and constant process review. The Coast Guard hopes
this measured approach toward improvement and innovation will
enhance the management of its limited resources.
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IV. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter summarizes the relevant literature on control
systems as it applies to this research. It introduces the
management concepts central to our comparative analysis. The
first section will cover control systems: what they are and
why organizations have them. It provides a generic model of
control that will serve as the framework for our analysis.
The chapter's second and third sections present this analysis
of traditional, compliance-oriented inspections and the
alternative Total Quality approach to control, respectively.
Chapter III introduced the Coast Guard's overlay structure as
a mechanism to increase organizational innovativeness. The
last section of this chapter explores the theory behind these
parallel structures, their purpose, philosophies, advantages
and limitations.
A. CONTROL SYSTEM FUNDAMENTALS
1. Definitions
Agreeing on basic terminology is important when
analyzing management systems. The wide-ranging definitions of
control reflect the many theories about this subject. In this
thesis, definitions reflect the Coast Guard's bureaucratic
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nature. This distinction is important because the
organization's environment and structure impacts directly on
the control mechanism.
Structures channel effort and energy in a particular
direction. Since they channel effort, changes in
structure can lead to changes in how people behave at
work. . .The essence of the bureaucratic organization is the
production of standardized, predictable, replicable
performance by many different people and/or groups... The
basic parameters of a bureaucracy are centralized control,
task specialization, functional grouping and internal
standardization. (Bushe, 1991, p. 3-6)
Most bureaucratic organizations are large and complex
in nature. In order for them to be effective, "such
organizations require some system for monitoring and
redirecting their diverse and specialized activities."
(Gortner, 1989, p. 204) Toward this end, control is the
"means used by an organization to elicit the performance it
needs and to check whether the quantities and qualities of
such performance are in accord with organizational
specifications." (Euske, 1984) This definition supports the
criteria that a bureaucracy's control system "assist in the
management process and guide and correct the bureaucracy's
efforts to achieve its mission." (Gortner, 1989, p. 215)
2. Design for Efficiency or Innovation?
The organization's bureaucratic character channels
individual and group efforts in a certain manner. The
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longstanding debate surrounding organizational design is how
to best channel these efforts to achieve desired results.
Contingency theory in organization design basically
asserts that in a stable environment the best thing to
do is organize for efficiency, and in an uncertain
environment, organize for innovation. This is seen as
a basic trade-off. Organizational characteristics
that lead to innovation are the opposite of those that
lead to efficiency. Studies of long-term
organizational effectiveness, however, reveal that it
is possible to be both efficient and innovative.
(Bushe, 1991, p. 15)
Control systems, especially very different approaches
like compliance inspections and TQM, can influence the
delicate balance of efficiency and innovation. Bureaucracies
seek strict adherence to procedures through their inspections.
This procedural standardization increases efficiency but only
by decreasing the ability of subordinate units to adapt
procedures to their immediate environment. Dynamic,
innovative organizations, on the other hand, lose consistency
of effort when they allow subordinate units to change rules
and standards to meet local demands. These type of
organizations are prone to adopt controls like those advocated
by TQM. This approach of unit-level or self-control allows
some questioning and experimenting with established, system-
wide procedures. Gortner poses a difficult question to
bureaucracies concerned with balancing efficiency and
innovation through the design of its control system. "Should
it [the control system] serve the information needs of
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internal adjustment (innovation) or the requirements of
political and legal accountability (efficiency)?" (Gortner,
1989, p. 213)
3. Basic Model of Control
The fact that the Coast Guard is a bureaucratic
organization plays an important role in our analysis of
external and self-control mechanisms. Its bureaucratic
culture and activities are impacted by the philosophical and
systemic issues raised by these dissimilar control systems.
A basic model of control provides a framework to better
delineate the differences between external control (e.g.,
inspections) and internal control (e.g., TQM-based processes)
.
By reducing these larger systems to their basic components,
the analysis puts the two control methods into sharp contrast.
Figure 4, on the following page, shows the basic model
(Aldag, 1991) as having eight activities. Seven of the eight
are clearly stated: goals and objectives, standards and
rules, behavior and activities, results, measurement and
comparison, evaluation and reward and corrective action. The
remaining element, feedback, is inferred by the model's
arrows. The illustration does not imply that feedback is a
secondary consideration. In fact, the model suggests that
feedback is critical since it is the element that joins all
the others together.
47













the cycle of control.
Goals and standards are
set. Then, behavior and
activities are monitored
and compared to desired
performance. If corrective
action is required, steps
are taken to redirect the
activities toward more Figure 4 Basic Control Model
desirable results. Rewards
are used to reinforce behaviors that complement the
organization's goals. These eight elements of control have
different levels of significance in various control systems.
The following sections show the relative importance of these
components in a compliance mechanism and in a TQM-based
system.
B. EXTERNAL COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS
As the Coast Guard moves toward a continuous improvement
philosophy, it should revisit earlier decisions about its
control systems and the impact they have on organizational
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goals of efficiency and innovation. The Coast Guard's
historical use of compliance inspections should not go
unchallenged.
1. Normative Assumptions
Compliance-oriented control systems are supported by
a philosophy very different from that which supports
continuous improvement. There are number of normative
assumptions about individual values that bureaucracies have
long used to justify a strict, rules-oriented means of
control
.
Subordinates naturally dislike and avoid work.
Subordinates are motivated through extrinsic threats
and rewards. Organizations must make systems idiot
proof. Subordinates should only be seen working and
not heard. There are experts for everything, and only
they know what is important. (Bushe, 1991, p. 12 0)
An organization that considers its people to lack motivation
and who naturally dislike their work will build a control
mechanism that reflects these beliefs. Bureaucracies break
down tasks into simple repetitive actions. One person
supervises a number of subordinates, and authority figures
make all the decisions. The goal of a bureaucracy's control
system is to "enforce its rules and standards by managing
people through tasks." (Bushe, 1991, p. 120)
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2. Goals and Objectives
These normative assumptions lead organizations to
design systems that leave the unmotivated and untrustworthy
workers out of decision-making processes. Bureaucracies leave
the responsibility for defining goals and objectives to top
management while relegating its subordinate personnel to roles
of implementation.
Gortner states that policy makers often define the
bureaucracy's strategic goals on the basis of legal
reguirements and on the need to ensure organizational
survival.
Externally generated laws form the basis of rational
bureau activity. Executive-branch agencies at every level
of government are subject to numerous legal and political
checks. A bureau is subject to control by outside
authorities, and internal control is maintained by the
chain-of-command leading to a politically accountable
executive. (Gortner, 1989, p. 207)
Since it cannot trust its workers to comply with legal
reguirements, a bureaucracy must ensure its continued
viability by establishing a hierarchical structure that
designs and enforces rules from the top.
3. Standards and Rules
Policy makers define organizational goals and then
establish a control system to attain them. Compliance
inspections provide a mechanism to ensure subordinate units
are following the procedures laid out by top management. The
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closer subordinate units follow the procedures, the more
secure management feels about meeting its requirements.
Detailed rules, therefore, are fundamental to compliance
oversight.
The most efficient organization requires competent
execution of well-designed work routines. Such
organizations routinize as much work as possible and
search for ever better routines to do more with less.
This is efficient because rules and routines act as a
means for coordinating labor. (Bushe, 1991, p. 26)
Compliance inspections reinforce this process of
standardization. This type of control diminishes threats to
meeting organizational goals by errant individuals by
identifying and eliminating nonconformists and non-performers.
Procedural uniformity throughout the organization guarantees
top management of meeting its requirements as efficiently as
possible.
4. Behaviors and Activities
The effort to standardize tasks has important
implications for the organization. It places a heavy burden
on top management who must define the work processes. To
achieve consistency, management must publish error-free
procedures. This task is daunting because management's own
tasks are different from that of organization's workers. If
management publishes ill-defined procedures, the organization
loses consistency of effort.
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Compliance inspections also create certain behaviors
at the worker level. This type of control motivates workers
to simply follow procedures. This may increase efficiency but
it decreases individual innovation. Organizations may become
more concerned with rule-following than output. "When
evaluations are ultimately based on rule compliance, rule
following may become the real goal, thereby displacing the
original service goal." (Gortner, 1989, p. 217) By creating
a rule-following work ethic, compliance inspections increase
the pressure on top management to design effective work
procedures that truly meet its overall goals.
5. Results
A control system is designed to minimize the variance
between what is expected and what actually occurs. By making
the jobs as routine and mechanical as possible, bureaucracies
design in a level of guality control.
...bureaucracies coordinate work through rules,
regulations and standardization of work processes and
skills. By designing how each individual task should be
done and then ensuring that people do it that way,
standardization of work processes builds coordination of
work right into the job design. (Bushe, 1991, p. 7)
The guotation above reveals the expected results of compliance
inspections: standardization. Compliance inspections are an
after-the-fact measure of conformance with established rules.
Compliance inspections check the behavior and activities of
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individual members and sub-units against desired standards.
This double-check assures management of a consistent work
effort. Bureaucracies, as was shown earlier, desire this
uniform work effort to meet their goals of survival and
political accountability. The strictness of the compliance
inspection, however, determines the level of uniformity and
the resulting efficiency attained by a bureaucracy.
6. Measurement and Evaluation
Organizations commit to performance criteria from
which they do not like to deviate. When situations develop
that take a process out of accepted parameters, variation
exists.
...processes are subject to two sources of variation:
normal and abnormal. . .Normal variations are common to
all elements of a process. Abnormal variation is due
to a special or specific cause... Some researchers
estimate that abnormal variations cause 15% of the
problems in a process, while normal variations cause
the remaining 85% (Gitlow and Hertz, 1987, p. 1-18)
To control variation, organizations set up systems to capture
signals of non-conformance. In this analysis, we see that
different control systems are interested in different types of
variance.
In the traditional, compliance-oriented system,
inspections may focus on either: (1) variance in rule-
compliance and (2) finding defects in the system's end
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products. Manufacturing firms that depend on mass inspections
examine their end products for unacceptable defects. Service
industries, like bureaucracies, use inspections to check for
conformance with established procedures. In both cases,
compliance inspections indicate a concern more for isolated
results rather than for problems throughout the inspected
process.
In the Coast Guard's case, compliance inspections
determine if units are following Headquarter mandates. The
inspection team uses a checklist to compare individual
activities and behaviors with procedures outlined in published
directives. The review of a vessel's past performance means
that the Coast Guard inspections occur after its work
processes are already completed. In this way, compliance
inspections serve as a control mechanism primarily concerned
with detection of errors after they have occurred. Thus, the
focus is on measuring the degree of compliance with standards
and rules more than evaluating the complete system of
processes (e.g., behaviors and activities) that contribute to
results.
Figure 5, on the following page, illustrates the
timing issues associated with this type of detection-oriented
control system. The process relies primarily on some type of




























inspection team) Figure 5 Detection Control System
often provides the information required to improve the
process. (Siegel, 1987, p. 57) This information, however,
tends to be time-late.
A detection-oriented control mechanism, like
compliance inspections, creates waste.
The drawback associated with detection is that
unacceptable product must be produced before people
can determine how to adjust the process. Obviously,
this wastes resources, for it costs just as much to.
produce an unacceptable product as acceptable
one. ... (Siegel, 1987, p. 57)
Since Coast Guard inspections only determine rule-compliance
at a specific time, there may be a period where the unit
follows improper procedures. Late detection increases waste
and reduces system efficiency.
7. Corrective Action
As noted in the last section, control systems are
interested in minimizing variance. Management assures itself
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of faithful application of procedures by examining end-
products. The after-the-fact inspection process supports the
idea that the bureaucracies are more interested in workers'
past actions than in correcting process problems.
In an earlier quotation about variation, errors were
described as being caused by normal errors 85% of the time.
These types of errors are often systemic problems under the
cognizance of management's control. Compliance-oriented
control systems, however, end up blaming people for these
mistakes. Inspections consider most variation to be caused by
poor implementation of otherwise good rules. Rarely is the
process considered to be at fault.
At the end of an inspection, the inspection team makes
a report up the chain-of-command about individual and unit
performance.
In most companies, the quality control system is designed
to go beyond control of product features and process
features. The system is also used to control the quality
performance of organizations and individuals, for example,
departments and department heads. (Juran, 1989, p. 151)
Workers and mid-management may become more interested in
passing inspections than in delivering a good product. This
type of goal displacement may achieve a short-term, higher
consistency of actions, but, in the long term, only serves to
decrease system efficiency.
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Some inspection reports are never used because of the
type of information they hold.
The accuracy of data may be questionable because of
collection problems or distortion, and it may be difficult
to get agreement on what constitutes good program output
measures. Often, data for control are collected but are
not used because of the political or professional
sensitivity of those data or because the knowledge of how
to correct or redirect organizational efforts is missing.
(Gorrner, 1989, p. 215)
The results of compliance inspections must be filtered through
management's political lens before corrective action can be
taken.
8. Rewards
Compliance inspections allow management to determine
faithful adherence to its rules. The organization seeks to
reinforce behavior that supports full compliance. Personnel
and unit evaluations are used to strengthen system-wide
support for management's policies. Those people who comply
with organizational procedures are rewarded with positive
evaluations. Non-conformists, however, receive negative
ratings and may be forced out of the organization. In this




Each control mechanism uses a different system to move
information within the organization. Whatever the system, an
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effective communications link "collects and conveys
information upward and routes it to actors who can interpret
and use it for making new policy or program choices."
(Gortner, 1989, p. 205) Both compliance inspections and TQM-
based control systems are different in the way they collect
information and use it to direct process changes.
Compliance inspections use formal reports as their
primary feedback method. Reports are used for informing
management about needed changes in their directives and
compelling subordinate units to change their activities.
Compliance inspection reports deliver information up
the chain-of-command about how well procedures are being
followed. In this way, policy makers can report to their
political superiors that their legal requirements are being
satisfied. Furthermore, in a bureaucracy, top management is
solely responsible for updates and changes to their
regulations. Inspection reports, when aggregated, present
management with an opportunity to evaluate the efficacy of
their procedures. If enough subordinate units show non-
conformance, management may perceive a need for change. In
this slow and ungainly manner, reports may generate some
innovation in the form of new regulations.
Compliance reports also provide management, via their
inspection teams, an opportunity to identify and correct
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improper behaviors at subordinate levels. By reporting
deviations to the unit's superiors, the inspection team hopes
to compel changes in unit-level activity. This type of top-
down feedback allows management to reinforce those activities
that achieve its desired results.
The tendency to reinforce established procedures
blinds the organization to possible process improvements.
When an inspection team discovers non-conformance, the team
considers the unit's procedural changes not as innovations but
as unsanctioned deviations from published policy. By
reporting deviations to supervisors, unit-inspired innovations
are lost when steps are taken to bring the unit back into
compliance. In this way, the reinforcing, top-down nature of
compliance feedback reduces organizational learning and
innovativeness
.
C. A TOTAL QUALITY SYSTEM
By using the basic model, presented in Figure 4, as a
framework for analysis, we have broken down the theoretical
components of compliance-oriented control systems. We now
turn this same framework to the analysis of the Coast Guard's
alternative system, self-control as promoted by TQM.
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1. Normative Assumptions
Intrinsic to TQM mechanisms is a profound belief in
individual motivation. The normative values associated with
TQM are a radical departure from those associated with
compliance inspections.
Subordinates naturally want to be involved in their
work and will volunteer for greater involvement.
Subordinates are motivated through recognition and the
opportunity to influence events. Systems allow for
individual creative contributions. Subordinates are
encouraged to give their ideas and opinions. Everyone
knows something important about his or her work.
(Bushe, 1991, p. 120)
These beliefs influence the structures that use TQM processes.
TQM procedures encourage groups to grapple with whole tasks.
These groups, lacking a formal hierarchy, become responsible
for resolving questions of internal leadership. They must
learn to make their own final decisions through a consensual
process. Procedures are designed to question the
organization's formal rules. Compared to compliance
inspection's "managing people through tasks," TQM systems
strive to "manage tasks through people." (Bushe, 1991, p. 120)
2. Goals and Objectives
While a compliance system would advocate the
preeminence of top management, goals and objectives under a
TQM system are defined by people of all ranks and stature, in
and out of the organization. TQA's Pillars of Quality
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(Chapter III) discussed how an organization can increase its
quality by focusing on its customers. Anybody, either
internal or external to the system, who benefits from an
organizational process, is a customer. By trying to satisfy
the needs and wishes of customers, an organization
continuously improves its processes and increases the quality
of its product.
3. Standards and Rules
A Total Quality Management system takes advantage of
the individual's desire to succeed. By increasing worker
participation in system monitoring, evaluation and adaptation,
TQM hopes to formalize a process of continuous improvement.
Effective participative management requires
moving the responsibility and accountability for
planning, problem-solving, and decision-making to the
lowest appropriate level; learning how to share
information, knowledge, power, and rewards; managing
the transition from manager-led to self-managing work
groups. (Sink, 1989, p. 52)
Participative management would require significant changes
within a bureaucratic organization like the military. TQM
mandates power-sharing and joint decision-making. It requires
that workers have the ability to adjust the process as they
see a need. In this sense, the organization must open its
rules and processes to questioning and experimentation.
Chapter Ill's discussion of TQA's Quality Action Teams and the
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FADE process reflects the types of TQM mechanisms often
suggested to empower workers and to improve the overall
system.
4. Behaviors and Activities
Process-oriented control systems, while promoting
innovation and adaptation, may be difficult to achieve in a
bureaucratic setting. "Structures that result in innovation
and change reguire considerable slack and tolerance of
inefficiencies." (Bushe, 1991, p. 26) Bureaucracies strive to
limit inefficiency through its compliance inspections. Strict
rule compliance is a defining characteristic for
bureaucracies. TQM suggests that every policy and every
procedure is open to guestion. Flexible processes are not a
mark of bureaucratic organizations.
Workers must be empowered by the organization to make
changes in processes as areas of improvement are identified.
Bureaucracies may exhibit a certain reluctance to share its
power throughout its ranks.
Bureaus are generally reguired to firmly fix
responsibility for actions in reporting to external
governmental bodies. To the extent that participatory
control in the public sector really does allow
officials to establish and monitor their own
professional performance standards, this reguirement
[participatory efforts] could be interpreted as
interfering with external accountability channels. In
fact, however, many legislative and judicial policy-
makers give bureaus wide discretion in defining
programs. (Gortner, 1989, p. 222)
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While legal requirements may not actually prevent power
sharing, authorities within the bureaucracy may reject such
efforts in the name of legal accountability.
5. Results
Workers are required to gather statistical data about
their processes' efficiency, responsiveness and effectiveness.
The taking of measurements over time makes sure that the
organization focuses on continuous improvement.
A TQM process of oversight management is, by definition,
a continuous process. Commanders at every level assess
performance and proficiency by taking measurements,
providing data and following trends. This information, as
it is passed up and down the chain of command, become
management indicators of ongoing improvements in
proficiency, in performance, and in the process itself.
(Naval Reserve DET 420, 1992, p. 31)
Total Quality Management argues for self-control over
processes. This means that workers are responsible for
tracking their customers' satisfaction and improving processes
as problems and solutions indicate. If the workers learn of
a process failure, changes to process must be based on
statistical data and not made by nebulous "common sense"
approaches. Improvements made on "gut feelings" have a
tendency to sub-optimize the system in some fashion. TQM
processes, like FADE, are designed to identify the optimal
solution with the aid of workers and customers alike.
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6. Measurement and Evaluation
Statistical information is central to TQM processes.
Without data gathering, the advantages of worker participation
and power sharing diminish. Participative management schemes
are not effective if there is no supporting data to suggest
areas for improvement. Measurements "provide a method for
logically and systematically evaluating information.
Specifically they help determine process stability, the
ability to consistently meet consumer requirements, and the








preventing Figure 6 Prevention Control System
procedural and product defects. Self-control over internal
processes increases the likelihood that workers would identify
systemic problems before product completion. This focus
indicates a more prevention- versus detection-oriented
philosophy. The difference between self-control and



















isolated end products. Self-control mechanisms not only
measure the results themselves but multiple factors that can
influence the results. These factors include but are not
limited to activities, behaviors, rules, procedures, and any
number of other inputs (e.g., machinery, material, workforce,
methods and environment) . The measurement of a wide range of
factors allows a quality organization to determine more
precisely the causes of procedural or product defects. This
statistical data allows for a deliberate, continuous
improvement process.
With data playing such a pivotal role, a Total Quality
organization must make sure that measurements are actually
supporting its organizational goals. TQM requires well-
defined goals and performance standards. Should there be any
confusion about these goals or standards, errors in
measurement may occur. Organizations may collect data at the
wrong point in the process, or they may not collect it at all.
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Data may suffer from problems of inaccuracy,
invalidity and from ambiguous or conflicting standards
for evaluating results. The accuracy of output
measurement may be compromised by the kinds of
intentional and unintentional distortion common to
organizational communications. Validity is
compromised whenever there is uncertainty or conflict
over the definition of the organization's program
outputs. (Gortner, 1989, p. 210)
Compliance and TQM-type control systems depend on data
regardless of its intrinsic problems. The organization should
take these drawbacks into consideration when designing or
choosing its control system.
7. Corrective Action
Both compliance and TQM control systems require
remedial action when problems are identified. Compliance
inspections tend to focus on individual implementation issues
as the cause of procedural problems. Self-control systems,
however, focus management's efforts on systemic causes, both
behavioral and procedural in nature.
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An earlier quotation about variance indicated that 15%
of all errors were caused abnormal situations. TQM control
systems would state that this same figure equates to the
percentage of time that worker error is the cause of problems.
TQM insists that systemic issues are the primary culprits in
process failures. These systemic factors can derive from any
of the areas described as targets for measurements in the
previous discussion (e.g., rules, task activities, materials).
It is through the use of statistics that self-control
processes are able to identify specific cause-and-ef fect
relationships. Without statistics, management is left with
"common sense" solutions and sub-optimized processes.
Confusions between common and special causes of variation
leads to frustration at all levels, more variation, and
higher costs... The only safe way to differentiate the
sources of variation is through statistical signals.
(Gitlow and Hertz, 1987, p. 1-18)
8 . Rewards
Total Quality systems do not depend on extrinsic
rewards to reinforce behavior. This is radically different
from compliance inspections which motivates its workers
through positive or negative reports, promotions and bonuses.
A Total Quality organization recognizes that an important
source of motivation includes intrinsic factors. As TQM's
basic philosophy asserts, people work hard because they want
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to excel and to express themselves as professionally as
possible. System improvements are made gladly and are their
own rewards.
9. Feedback
The flow of information inside a Total Quality
organization is critical to its ability to innovate and
continuously improve. Customer feedback is the first step in
goal definition. Workers must strive to form close internal
and external customer-supplier relationships. In this way,
the organization can closely monitor its reguirements.
Statistical data is constantly generated at the work
station and must be used by workers and management alike to
determine if the processes remain within acceptable
tolerances. If data suggests a problem, management and
workers must be open to each others' ideas and concerns.
Total Quality improvement processes, like FADE, hinge on the
ability of customers and suppliers and workers and management
to identify and resolve complex issues together.
68
10. Results of Framework Analysis
By using the basic model's eight elements as a
framework for our analysis, we found that compliance control
systems are rule-specific, top-down managed, detection-
oriented, and product-based. By using this same analytical
framework, TQM systems were found to be rule-innovative,
process-based and prevention-oriented. Table I provides a
guick-look comparison of the two control systems.






















































D. PARALLEL LEARNING STRUCTURES
As part of its efforts to employ TQA, the Coast Guard has
set up an overlay structure. Chapter III described the
overlay as using workers and managers to resolve complex
problems within a parallel, linking structure. This section
explores more closely the theoretical underpinnings of this
concept.
1. Purpose
There are three major areas of study about the purpose
of parallel learning structures (PLS)
.
One group focuses on parallel learning structures as a way
for managers to resolve ill-defined, complex
problems. . .Another group focuses on these structures as a
way to build adaptability into bureaucratic
organizations. . .A third group focuses on learning
structures as a way to transform bureaucratic
organizations. (Pasmore, 1990, p. 173)
Current theories hold that an organization's transformation
goal will impact on the type of parallel structure it will
design. Each of the three distinctive goals of parallel
learning structures are elaborated below.
First, if problem solving is the goal, the
organization sets up a temporary parallel learning structure.
Bureaucracies can handle well-defined, routine issues but are
unable to deal effectively with multi-faceted, complex
problems. "Parallel learning structures overcome this problem
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because those closest to the problem and those with authority
to implement solutions are involved in recommending
solutions." (Pasmore, 1990, p. 175) What differentiates this
type of structure from task forces or committees is that
parallel learning structures must have a non-authoritarian,
non-threatening environment to enhance problem-solving.
Permanent parallel learning structures can also help
organizations to become more adaptable. In this case, a PLS
supplements the formal organization on a permanent basis. The
permanent steering committee provides continuity and direction
to efforts to improve innovation. Smaller groups chartered by
the steering committee may be temporary as fits the nature of
the problem. The PLS reflects the formal organization so it
can retain the advantages of a well-structured, heavily-
resourced bureaucracy. It promotes individual efforts,
however, within the parallel structure to gain the advantages
of innovation. Theorists advocate that individual initiatives
(intrapreneurism) within the organization require a PLS to
flourish. The parallel learning structure formalizes a
framework of support, development and implementation groups.
In this way, an otherwise rigid organization can nurture
innovation. (Pasmore, 1990, p. 174-177)
The last function for PLS suggested by theorists is
for cultural transformation. As the PLS committees and groups
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meet, they establish different norms and rules. As group and
committee members cycle back into the formal organization,
they take these new norms with them and encourage their use in
the formal structure. In this manner, the PLS infuses the
bureaucracy with ideals supportive of participatory
management. As these ideals flourish in the organizational
mainstream, innovation and adaptability increase. This
"seepage of ideas," however, may cause a shift in political
coalitions. This may invoke a preemptive response from the
power houses in the bureaucracy. If the power holders find it
too threatening, they might terminate the parallel learning
structure. (Pasmore, 1990, p. 180)
The Coast Guard hopes to use a parallel learning
structure to increase its organizational innovation. The
parallel or overlay structure, described in Chapter III, would
allow a free-flow of ideas and present an opportunity to
resolve complex issues through a customer-supplier dialogue.
Theory states organizations that use a PLS to increase
innovation should be concerned with possible cultural
transformations. There is some question whether a military
organization, with its hierarchical culture, can co-exist with
a participative, TQM-based parallel structure. The various
group processes advocated by TQM require power sharing and
organizational relationships based on expert power rather than
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positional power. These cultural differences may lead to two
possible results: (1) the formal organization adopts the
culture of the PLS, or (2) the formal organization terminates
the parallel structure.
2. Scope of Effort
Decision-makers must review many organizational
aspects when contemplating a change to management processes.
A technological intervention is a change in the technology
and/or structure of an organization with the purpose of
improving or stabilizing the entire socio-technical system
in that organization. All organizations are composed of
a technical system (the technology, formal structure,
rules and regulations) and a social system (informal
groups, cliques, patterns of interaction) nested in an
environment. (Bushe, 1991, p. 2)
An attempt to redesign a bureaucracy must consider the impacts
on not only the organization's structure but also on its
technological base and its social systems.
3. Basic Characteristics
Most people characterize bureaucracies as rigid, task
oriented, multi-layered hierarchies. To move beyond the
problems associated with such structures, bureaucracies build
parallel structures, a type of technological intervention.
Parallel structures, regardless of their strategic purpose,
have elements in common.
In its most basic form, a parallel learning structure
consists of a steering committee that provides overall
direction and authority and a number of small groups with
norms and operating procedures that promote a climate
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conducive to innovation, learning and group problem
solving. Members of the parallel learning structure are
also members of the formal organization, though within the
parallel structure their relationships are limited to the
formal chain of command. Some parallel learning structures
are set up on a temporary basis, while others are intended
to be permanent. (Bushe, 1991, p. 10)
As the guote shows, organizations design a parallel
learning structure to be a non-intrusive reflection of the
formal organization. To "promote a conducive climate,"
parallel learning structures must be flexible, with few rules
and loosely defined tasks. One of the key characteristics of
a PLS is that it requires the organization to set aside a time
and a place away from daily operating concerns so the group
may consider future opportunities. Open communications are
critical to this type of intervention. A parallel structure's
operating norms must be different from those of the formal
organization. It must promote cooperation, non-hierarchical
relations and effective group problem solving. (Pasmore, 1990,
p. 172)
4. Challenges in Implementing Parallel Structures
One underlying principle colors every form of parallel
structure: people will act differently in the PLS than they
do in the formal organization. By creating an environment
that encourages members of the formal organization to express
themselves and their ideas, parallel learning structures hope
to improve the overall system. What theorists do not know is
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whether or not people will be able to transition easily
between the restrictive, authoritarian bureaucracy and the
non-hierarchical, free-wheeling parallel structure.
Simply setting up a parallel structure will not, in and of
itself, make people more courageous. But establishing
clear boundaries and role expectations that build
legitimacy for such behaviors surely increases the
possibility that people will risk a different way of
behaving at work. (Bushe, 1991, p. 11)
Even though the system sets up a safe haven for new ideas, the
movement between the two structures may be confusing to
people. When they are members of the PLS, people should
question the organization and all its rules. When they return
to their normal duties, however, these same people must comply
and ensure compliance with the organization's procedures.
E. SUMMARY
An organization divides labor and resources to accomplish
its goals. It then sets up a control mechanism to make sure
that its actions equal its desired results. For
bureaucracies, control derives from a need for organizational
survival and to meet legal requirements. Inherent to any
control mechanism is a feedback loop of information to those
who have control over the organization's processes. Without
accurate and timely data, the organization may not know to
adjust its processes and, therefore, it may operate outside
acceptable parameters.
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This thesis concerns itself with two alternative control
mechanisms. The first alternative, compliance inspections, is
an after-the-fact detection of errors. This type of oversight
rests on normative values of management-employee distrust, a
belief that individuals lack motivation and commitment to the
organization's work. These beliefs lead to a system where
management generates all policies, checks for consistency of
effort and is the only element that may make changes to
existing policies. This type of system can lead to wasted
resources, rule following, and time-late corrections to the
system.
Self-control through a Total Quality approach offers the
Coast Guard an alternative to compliance inspections. This
type of control system is preventive in nature because it uses
statistical measurements to review process and product alike.
Normative values of trust and individual motivation are the
cornerstones of TQM. The success of this type of
participative management depends on the degree of
recalcitrance of the bureaucracy in which it is practiced and
the quality of data on which decision-making is based.
Organizations using TQM must encourage power sharing and must
devise methods to ensure data validity.
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To improve their existing processes, organizations have
turned toward parallel learning organizations to supplement
their normal activities. Bureaucracies, to promote
consistency, have been found to stifle learning and
innovation. By providing its members a parallel system to
support their ideas, bureaucracies hope to foster innovation
in its formal organizational practices. Bureaucracies also
use these parallel environments to solve complex problems and
to encourage a cultural transformation within their
organization. The free-flow of ideas within the parallel
structure is critical to its success. Some guestion exists
whether people can effectively contribute to a parallel




Chapter IV provided the theoretical attributes of both
compliance and TQM-based control systems. The interview data,
presented in this chapter, allows us to determine if these
theoretical differences are supported by data from fleet and
support personnel.
As Chapter I described, the interviews were conducted with
personnel in the logistics chain-of-command. Interviewees
included supply and command representatives of 378s and shore
side policy makers and inspection personnel. The interviews
were designed to create a free-flow of subjective data about
the participants' full range of reactions to current and
alternative control practices. The interviews also provide
insights into local control and improvement practices on board
378' cutters.
Chapter V continues to use the framework of the basic
model of control to guide the analysis. The framework is used
in the first section to evaluate interview data about
compliance inspections. The next section presents interview
data about self-control practices that have been implemented
by CSS.
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As discussed in Chapter I, this analysis does not
represent a true comparison between TQM and compliance
practices since TQM has not been implemented aboard High
Endurance Cutters. The CSS environment, however, does present
a view of self-management and innovation often associated with
a Total Quality approach to control. While the interview data
does not fully represent a TQM system, we feel the research
provides an understanding of the differences between
compliance and self-control.
A. COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS
Chapter IV presented the delicate balancing act a
bureaucracy must face when designing its control systems. The
balance of efficiency (i.e., procedural uniformity) and
innovativeness (i.e., ability to learn) is difficult.
Literature suggests that bureaucracies settle for efficiency
at the price of innovativeness. (Bushe, 1991) One of our
interview goals was to examine how the Coast Guard's
compliance inspections have affected the balance of these two
important organizational attributes.
The actual design of the control system may serve to
enhance organizational efficiency or its innovativeness. In
the compliance model, policy makers tell the field what they
consider to be most important through published directives.
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The compliance action itself reinforces this prioritization of
procedures. Presence of items on checklists and attention to
specific details by inspectors highlight the importance that
Headquarters attaches to certain rules.
1. Goals and Objectives
The organization's control mechanism reflects the
group that owns the process. In the theoretical model for
compliance inspections, we learned about top management's
preeminence in control of the process. Management first
defines the processes in its published goals and standards and
then asserts its ownership through rule-checking enforcement.
The theoretical model for compliance inspections
suggests that policy-makers should feel in control of their
processes. Coast Guard policy makers, however, revealed
significant frustration with the Coast Guard's compliance
system. Policy makers at both the MLC and Headquarters level
expressed consternation with the amount of seemingly
unenforceable procedures. "When policy makers put pen to
paper, it is obviously important or the instruction would not
be signed. It's crazy for us (the Coast Guard) not to follow
the instructions." The general consensus among top management
was that unit personnel choose the policies they wish to
follow. Policy makers felt this selective rule-following
reduces the effectiveness of central authority. "If there's no
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one out there nailing these guys (for non-conformance), why
should they follow the rules?" The interviews suggest that
theory and reality agree that policy makers define goals and
objectives. Equally important, the interviews revealed that
enforcement of policy is critical to its success. The data
also supports the normative assumptions posed in Chapter IV;
workers must be watched and their actions corrected to ensure
conformance.
2. Standards
A critical area of importance to the compliance model
of control is the dependence on published procedures.
Bureaucratic control theory suggests that if management wants
uniformity of procedures, then it is responsible for building
the best procedures possible.
For CSS, the interviews revealed mixed feelings at the
policy level about the need for ASPM compliance. Some policy-
makers felt the supply manual should represent guidelines that
would allow some autonomy of action and provide for some unit-
level innovation. "It's hard to tell if the ships are getting
sufficient guidance from the ASPM. Now is not the time for
hard-nosed compliance checks, but time to let the ships figure
out and improve the procedures." Others felt that the ASPM
represented orders and should be followed to the letter. This
latter group felt that headquarters should not allow
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independent changes to procedure. "The Coast Guard should not
issue guidelines, but orders, when it issues policy. Ships
get to pick-and-choose whatever they want to do now. Why
bother writing policy if no one follows it?" This latter
group felt that if a unit wished to challenge certain
procedures, the unit should do so by bringing the guestionable
procedure to the attention of the policy makers for their
review. Thus, there is not a shared view regarding the
desirability of standardized procedures for CSS. Some of the
interviews reflect an orientation supporting unit-level
discretion and innovation while others indicate strong support
for strict enforcement and uniformity.
Besides its detailed rules, another theoretical
attribute of compliance inspections is its focus on products
rather than on processes. Coast Guard inspections support
this focus by looking at the documentation that result from a
supply department's rules and procedures. "They come aboard
and they check my files and my paperwork. They can get pretty
picky." Even then, the ships generally agree these are the
areas that require additional work prior to the inspection
visit. "I have my people clean up the loose ends in my files.
I review old purchases and straighten up my property records."
Many of the ships pointed out the same areas. This fact
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speaks about the priority that the fleet attaches to these
general requirements.
For those items that compliance inspections did check,
most supply officers felt the checklist requirements were
important but minor when compared to their CSS practices.
Inspection-required changes were easy and were usually trivial
in terms of their impact on effective supply operations.
"There's a number of checklist items that really don't matter.
For example, I don't know why I need a letter-to-file telling
me who can purchase things. If they (the inspectors) want
one, I can gin one up in a hurry, but it's a waste of my
time.
"
3. Behaviors and Activities
Management theory holds that compliance-oriented
control systems are coordinated from the top-down and that
behaviors are directed by the organization's hierarchy as
reflected in its procedures. The interviews support theory
only in that the shipboard hierarchy provides the extrinsic
motivation needed to compel rule-following. The interviews
showed ships responding more in accord with their commanding
officers' wishes and not necessarily in line with directives.
The interviews confirmed the policy makers' concerns
that ships were not adhering to all published directives.
Most unit personnel admitted to selecting the procedures they
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wished to follow. The majority stated that this selection
process resulted from the large number of requirements placed
on the ships. "If I did everything on the checklists, I would
get very little done that's important." In the name of time
management, shipboard leaders had to determine which
requirements would have the greatest benefit for the ship.
One Executive Officer, echoing his peers, labeled this process
as an "unfortunate cost of doing business."
While all the CO/XO interviewees considered most of
the requirements to have administrative value, they
acknowledged the preeminence of operational concerns.
Procedural requirements would not constrain most of the
commanding officers if they felt their operational capability
was being impaired. "Ships do not sail for the lack of an
easily attainable part. Economics are important but should
not prevent my sailing." "If I feel a certain pump would make
my operations better, then I would change it even if I were
told not to. It's my ship."
These last quotations do not serve as object lessons
in logistical short-sightedness. They represent the attitudes
inculcated by a Coast Guard culture that encourages and
depends on personal initiative and innovativeness.
Historically, these traits have proven invaluable when
commanding officers have been faced with a sluggish, non-
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responsive supply system. The interviews clearly support
LMI's assertion (found earlier in Chapter II), "the Coast
Guard relies heavily on the Commanding Officer's initiative to
overcome shortfalls in supply support when they occur."
A commanding officer's initiatives have long motivated
shipboard subordinates. In this case, COs use inspections to
motivate their subordinates. One commanding officer stated,
"I believe people do a lot better when placed under pressure.
Compliance inspections provide that pressure to perform, and
I don't mitigate it [the pressure]." Subordinates adopt the
attitude that their commanding officer's project about the
importance of inspections.
The interviews revealed an interesting aspect about
how people view inspection standards. Most respondents,
policy makers and shipboard personnel alike, stated they felt
that inspection standards were performance minimums. The
ships should strive to exceed the checklist requirements.
They admitted, however, that a work-up period was required to
bring the ship into line with checklist standards. The ship's
performance level would improve during the inspection period,
but it inevitably would slide back to pre-inspection
standards. Most officers stated "almost after every
inspection the ship falls back to business as usual." While
ships may think their requirements are minimum criteria, they
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are, in actuality, treated like maximums. "If I could just
maintain all the checklist standards for a period of time, I
would be happy." This shows that checklists lead to the
acceptance of published standards with few ships seeking to
move their performance beyond the standards. This supports
management theory that procedural uniformity, while increasing
efficiency, reduces innovativeness.
There is not, however, agreement about the efficiency
of behaviors undertaken to achieve procedural uniformity. The
work-up period before the actual inspection relates directly
to the issue of efficiency. COs and XOs felt that this work-
up period was a useful training period. Time spent was
minimal and did not detract from routine business. "My people
don't spend any time on preparing for inspections. We've been
following these procedures all along." "Sure, there's some
work up but it's only about a week or so. It doesn't hurt us
to clean up our paperwork a little." These statements
contradict, however, what supply officers and their
subordinates feel. Their interviews state that the work-up
period is excessive and significant time and effort is spent
preparing for the inspection. The time spent on inspection-
related items was time spent away from regular, operations-
related work. "We spent our last three month deployment
working on the checklist. We had to push off our normal
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routine to take care of this stuff. Not that the regular work
doesn't get done, it just gets done later."
When asked whether this practice of working up to an
inspection was efficient, most inspectors stated, "had the
ships been doing their job properly all along, there would not
be a need for an extensive work-up period." One inspector
felt that work-up periods were poetic justice for past
choices. "Don't come crying to me about how messed up you were
and how long it took you to get ready for the inspection."
While rule-following is the predominant behavior, the
interviews indicate a conflict with theory in that not all
rules were obeyed at all times and it is the ship's hierarchy
that motivates conformance, not top management. Additionally,
while the inspection elevates shipboard performance for a
short while, it does not prevent a return to previous sub-
standard performance. This suggests that compliance
inspections only fix short-term problems but do not compel
systemic improvement or motivate guality performance.
4. Results
Theoretical attributes include procedural uniformity
and the resulting organizational efficiency. The Coast
Guard's inspection program assures a certain level of
uniformity and does gain some advantages in learning curve
efficiencies.
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Chapter IV pointed out that compliance-oriented
control theory supports results that meet organizational goals
of survival and political accountability. The interviews
revealed some confusion between management's desired results
and the fleet's expectations about inspections. Coast Guard
inspectors "conduct inspections to forestall waste, fraud and
abuse." Their aim is strictly administrative. While
shipboard personnel appreciate this mission, there is some
idea that inspections should be more focused on readiness-
related processes. Management, through its compliance
inspections, does achieve for the most part uniform results.
"As long as I have been inspecting, most of the ships have
been doing what they are suppose to. We haven't had many
negative reports at all." As previous sections have
indicated, however, there is some selectivity on the part of
the ships about rule-following.
The shipboard interviews indicated a mixed feeling
about the intended results of inspections. At the supply
department level, most interviewees felt that inspections
should focus more on readiness than on uniformity. One supply
officer, echoing most of his peers, remarked "What I get
marked on (evaluated) is whether I get this ship away from the
dock with all the right parts. No one looks at that." The
belief that Coast Guard management should look at these types
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of readiness issues is not necessarily shared by command
personnel. One commanding officer stated "I'm not sure I want
that sort of oversight. It may very well cut into my
prerogatives as the CO." A dissenting opinion at the command
level is represented by another commanding officer's remarks.
"My boss already has an idea about my readiness level through
the SORTS report (an operational status message) . It's no big
deal to me, but I guestion the value of an inspection that
looks at those sort of procedures. The inspectors may not
know what my people really do to get this ship underway, and
I'm not sure I want them (the inspectors) to know." Thus
there is not a consensus among shipboard personnel about the
intended results of compliance inspections. People at the
worker level feel that inspections tied to their actual
functions would better evaluate their efforts while command
personnel seem more interested in maintaining their autonomy.
All the policy makers felt that the inspections were
designed to ensure uniformity of procedures across the fleet.
They also believe that inspections were designed to primarily
benefit Headquarters. "I believe every ship should be doing
supply procedures exactly the same, no questions asked. This
would help to reduce the learning curve quickly." "We don't
have the time or the money to be training people as they move
from ship to ship." The entire organization would benefit
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from standardized procedures. Policy makers felt the fact
that ships receive additional training and oversight is a nice
but secondary benefit of compliance inspections. As pointed out
earlier, the actual compliance process reinforces the system's
desire for efficiency. The process of sending out advance
checklists and then conducting a thorough oversight visit
ensures that organizational units are following published
directives. The reader is reminded that while CSS processes
are not checked, other supply functions such as commercial
purchases and property accounting are major parts of current
Coast Guard compliance inspections.
The inspection checklists give the ships advance
notice of the relative importance of specific procedures. One
executive officer said compliance inspections were good for
the ships administratively because "inspections force you to
look at the instructions. " Most COs and XOs stated that the
checklists have become integral parts of their regular command
functions. "I make my department heads use the checklists in
the relief process. These lists also help to drive regular
training and work requirements." Compliance inspections also
increase unit training. "If you have the right inspector, you
can get a lot of good training out of an inspection." Through
internal and external training then, procedural uniformity
increases.
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5. Measure and Evaluate
Theoretical attributes of infrequent, detection
oriented control is well supported not so much by the
interview process but by the facts surrounding Coast Guard
inspections. The Coast Guard inspects on a biennial basis,
using an external inspection team, armed with a checklist, to
conduct a paperwork review to determine compliance with
established procedures.
The COs and XOs interviewed were very clear about
their regard for these type of inspections. They were very
glad to have an external, objective evaluation of their
administrative management. "I like someone else to come in
and take a look at my house. If it needs cleaning, sometimes
they can tell me more than my own people." While there are
some negative connotations about inspections, they are
generally viewed as "a good but necessary evil." "Inspections
can be adversarial. It all depends on the inspector. I think
most captains really appreciate the honest evaluation and
training that comes along with an inspection."
6. Corrective Action
Interviews contradict the theoretical attribute that
correction of personal behavior is a component of compliance-
oriented control. Policy makers believe there is little
personal accountability for non-compliance. One interviewee
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raised the example of a general property inspection. "When
faced with a significant dollar error in property
accountability, a unit is more likely to question procedures
rather than discipline the property manager." Some policy
makers felt this type of oversight perpetuates a system of
personal non-accountability and encourages non-compliance.
After an inspection, the team reports areas of non-
compliance to the unit's commanding officer and to the ship's
immediate chain-of-command. Shipboard personnel do not attach
particular significance to an inspection report's findings.
If a negative report was felt to be unjustified or unworthy,
then the offending requirement is either challenged or ignored
once the inspectors leave. "I will have my people question
those checklist items I agree are ridiculous. I won't
necessarily spend my time arguing with the inspector, but I'm
not afraid to write a letter. Sometimes, though, if the
matter is not that critical, we just continue operating the
way we did before."
The MLC inspection staff does not use these reports to
correct process problems. "We really don't do analysis of
systems here. Once a year, though, we compile a listing that
reflects the year's most frequently-experienced problems and
send it to the units so they can see the general weak areas."
This list may or may not compel policy changes. One policy
92
maker noted that different ships operate under different
supply systems. "Lessons learned would be important for the
ships if they were all operating their supply departments the
same. If all the ships were doing the same thing, then they
could seek common solutions. I hear one thing from the
Pacific Area and anther from the Atlantic and no common
solution is possible."
7 . Rewards
Theory states that extrinsic rewards reinforce
behavior sought by a compliance control mechanism. The
interviews support this view. When the inspection report team
files its findings with the chain-of-command, the organization
receives information about unit performance and an
individual's management skills. While shipboard personnel
admit the results show up as Officer Evaluation Report (OER)
items, they believe the generally positive remarks help them
and that negative remarks are inconsequential. "These reports
are so much OER filler. I'm not sure that anybody really
reads them anyway. Everyone, for the most part, comes away
with an excellent or an outstanding (evaluation) ." This seems
to contradict the amount of work shipboard personnel perform
prior to an inspection. The extensive work-up period
indicates a desire to receive a positive report and avoid
possible evaluation and promotion ramifications.
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8. Feedback
Both compliance and TQM control systems require
feedback channels to compel change. The compliance model
suggests that system improvement should occur after inspection
since top management must reconsider its policies. The Coast
Guard's compliance program generally supports this view.
While Headquarters and MLC encourage ships to submit
procedural changes up the chain-of-command, compliance
inspections represent the formal mechanism for organizational
review of operational procedures.
The current inspection process is not designed to
provide formal feedback to headquarters. Inspection teams
report that they have no requirement to send their reports to
Headquarters. "No, we don't send them (the reports) anywhere
but to the unit and its immediate chain-of-command. I'm not
sure headquarters would find them too useful anyway. The
information seems pretty unit specific." Compliance
inspection reports are generally not received and, therefore,
not used by headquarters to identify systemic problems for CSS
or other supply issues. A Headquarters policy maker stated,
"I've recently seen one inspection report. I don't know how
or why it got here, but one is not enough to work with."
Questionable areas identified during an inspection may
or may not come to the attention of policy makers. Inspectors
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are not required to seek clarification when there is a
disagreement about rule interpretation. Depending on the
personality of the inspector, the issue may never reach
Headquarters. "We recently had an inspection where I
disagreed with the inspector, he told me 'just follow the
book. ' I asked him if he was going to seek clarification and
he said, 'It's not my job.'" Only through sporadic,
individual efforts have problem areas been reported. Even
then, shipboard personnel generate most of this feedback.
"The issue was important enough to me for me to write a
letter." The fact that they must seek redress on their own
reinforces their feeling of isolation. "It just goes to show
that no cares as much as you do about your job."
The interviews did indicate that inspections did
provide a certain level of feedback to the commands. Most
shipboard personnel stated that one of the primary benefits of
inspections "is that they tell me how to do my job better.
They also teach me about rules that I really didn't know
existed." This type of feedback increases uniformity while
simultaneously enhancing knowledge about the system's
procedures. This form of learning, while different from
innovation and adaptation, reinforces management's efforts to
achieve its desired activities and results.
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B. SELF-CONTROL IN THE CSS ENVIRONMENT
To gauge support for internal control mechanisms as an
alternative to compliance inspections, the interviews covered
current self-monitoring procedures and TQM. The pick-and-
choose CSS implementation method has left some gaps in self-
monitoring, but ships are making real efforts to improve their
systems. Reactions to TQM ranged across the spectrum of full
support to loathing.
1. Goals and Objectives
A Total Quality approach to control would argue that
goals and objectives should be defined by internal and
external customers of the process. The interviews suggest
that many people in the Coast Guard feel that they are
involved in a very participative organization that allows
people of all ranks to contribute to policy and process
formulation.
In the CSS environment, supply personnel indicated
that they felt they are more responsive to their internal
customers than under the previous system. "My guys and I are
part of the system now. We see what the parts are used for
and understand why the engineers need them. I try to make
sure they have everything they need." "If we break down and
stay that way, its not the engineers' fault. We
(storekeepers) are responsible for keeping this ship running
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just as much as they are." As a result of this customer
orientation, some ships have made the Special Item Management
System (SIM) central to their response to onboard customer
demands.
The lack of enforcement in the CSS environment has
contributed to increased innovativeness and a greater
orientation to customer requirements. Supply department
personnel have felt free to adapt CSS procedures to better
meet their customers' needs. "We didn't like the ASPM's
receipt process. We changed it to reduce processing time and
to get the technicians their parts as soon as possible." "The
ASPM really doesn't have a good DLR (Depot Level Repairable)
program, so we designed our own." These examples show how
goals and objectives may be established by shipboard workers
when they are focused on their internal and external customer
demands
.
Most interview respondents felt that the Coast Guard
has long participated in TQM-like activities. Shipboard
personnel felt that the close-knit working environment made
378s one big Natural Working Group. The physically confining
structure and the operational demands make problem solving a
natural imperative for ships. "We've always had to count on
our people talking together. When you're on a ship, you've
got to solve your problems or watch your mission fail."
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TQM practices are not limited to ships, however. Even
MLC and headquarter representatives felt that the Coast Guard
has long depended on the ideas of junior personnel to ensure
its operational success. Most officers stated that good
officers had long practiced the inclusive practices of TQM.
One officer stated, "TQM is just what good officers have
always done and what bad officers will never do." Some
Headquarters personnel noted that since TQM has become the
management method of choice, "many of the high ranking people
have become very receptive to comments from all sorts of
people. I've seen some good changes come about because of
this willingness to listen."
2. Standards
While the CSS environment is not controlled by a Total
Quality system, it reflects the flexible attributes associated
with TQM control theory. Interviews of supply department
personnel revealed a need for flexible processes. While most
of the supply departments felt that every ship in the fleet
should be following the same procedures, they were not willing
give up their own practices to increase standardization.
"Yeah, I think its a good idea if everyone was doing the same
thing. That way, when I get a new storekeeper, I wouldn't
have to train him from ground zero. I don't think though that
the procedures were designed with my job in mind. The ASPM
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doesn't take into account my homeport or operational
environments." The supply personnel felt that their
operations reflected their particular working environments,
personnel and operational schedules. Standardization, it
appears, is a good idea for everybody else.
Procedural uniformity depends on stable processes.
The Afloat Supply Procedures Manual (ASPM) conveys the CSS
procedures headquarters would have its units follow. Most
supply department personnel, however, consider the ASPM to
serve as a guideline, not as orders. "I try to follow it as
much as I can. I think I'm doing most of the things I need to
be doing." Overall, the ASPM received poor ratings for its
procedural guidance. In fact, some ships shelved the
instruction in favor of its U.S. Navy antecedent. A number of
shipboard personnel said "I don't even use the ASPM. I use
the P-485, which is where the ASPM came from. There's no real
difference." A couple of people even said "I'm an old timer.
I prefer Volume III of the Comptroller's Manual. I can't find
anything in the ASPM anyway."
Since the supply representatives consider the
published rules inadequate, they used their innovativeness to
improve their internal processes. Major tenets of CSS like
mandatory allowances, mandatory usage of 1250-1 (a
requisitioning document) , and inventory accountability were
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generally adhered to but not in the specific manner outlined
by the instruction. "I don't use 1250s for all my
requisitions. Its too paper intensive." "I don't like the
filing system suggested by the ASPM. We do it differently."
"We don't do SIM (Special Item Management) because its too
time consuming and we really aren't there yet." "I run a
manual inventory system parallel to SCAMP because it (SCAMP)
doesn't do everything I need it to."
Bureaucratic management theory suggests that systems
become more efficient as they become more standardized. These
last few quotations indicate anything but standardization as
the individual CSS units adapted the ASPM to their own
environments. The interviews support the theory that
innovativeness comes at the expense of overall system
standardization
.
3. Behaviors and Activities
The Afloat Supply Procedures Manual does provide the
supply officer some self-control mechanisms for actively
managing the ship's supply system. The ASPM concentrates on
inventory control, usage data collection, and configuration
management. A ship's use of these mechanisms seemed tied to
the personality of the supply officers and the assistant
supply officers. "If you want to see an effective supply
system, make people work within the system. People don't
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trust the supply system to be responsive. If a ship is
getting underway or ready for deployment, and they need a
part, they go and get it wherever they can." Interpretation
of ASPM requirements, the ship's operational schedule and the
length of time the ship has been out of FRAM are factors that
determine which processes supply officers elect to follow.
Special Item Management (SIM) is a program that allows
the supply officer to track usage of consumable items and
parts. If the supply officer notes significant usage, the
item may be added to inventory in quantities that reflect the
usage rate. This program has great potential to increase
sustainability and unit readiness. Many ships have elected
not to perform this function or are performing it in a limited
manner. "We haven't really got that far yet. I'm not sure
its worth the time. I understand its a real time drain." The
primary reason for non-compliance is that the program is a
time consuming, manual process that would be accomplished
better through automation. "If headquarters can't give me the
software to do this job, then I don't see why I should do it."
Some ships have created a SIM system using the outmoded,
manual stock record cards. These particular ships, while
increasing unit sustainability, suffer time management
concerns due to maintaining both a manual and automated
inventory systems. "My people are very busy. I have a hard
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time keeping up my systems and giving the guys time for leave
and personal business."
The interviews indicate that one area of successful
internal control is inventory management. All the units
report on-going accountability practices to increase part
location/verification. There seems to be some confusion with
the requirements for bulkhead-to-bulkhead inventory counts
that has resulted in each ship establishing its own policy.
"We do a bulkhead-to-bulkhead every patrol." "We haven't done
a bulkhead-to-bulkhead. We think its absolutely absurd."
"The people who thought of that requirement obviously didn't
have anything better to do."
The addition and deletion of new and old parts due to
equipment changes is sporadic at best. Many units reported
inventories that had not been purged of old parts. "That's
something we really haven't gotten to yet. I know it's
important but I don't want to cut something that I may need
later." One fear of deleting this stock is that the supply
officers are not sure how the deletion of a part would impact
support for other installed equipment. "Without a good CALMS
document, I'm not sure what I am supposed to cut out or keep."
Self-control mechanisms and adherence to policy are
weakened by demanding schedules and a perceived lack of
oversight and support. As 378s exited FRAM, underwent a
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rigorous Ready-For-Sea period and began normal operations, the
supply department was hard-pressed to meet operational demands
while simultaneously setting up new CSS processes. Added to
these concerns are the ships on-going experiences with
systemic problems which impact their supply performance:
inaccurate allowance documents, shortfalls in inventory, and
inadequate computer support. The interviews revealed that as
pressure mounted, supply officers were very selective in their
following of CSS procedures. "I know I was blowing off the
ASPM, but I had a job to do. On top of that, there's just too
much stuff in the book to comply with." As operational
requirements became imperatives, supply departments did
whatever was necessary to get the ship underway, including
ignoring or changing regulations. "My job is to get this ship
away from the pier. I'll try to do it within regulations but
I'm not going to tell the captain we can't get underway
because I didn't want to buy a part uptown."
This willingness to change procedures is attributable
to another factor as well. The lack of compliance checks on
CSS procedures left the supply officers free to alter their
procedures and supply systems. "No one is checking CSS, which
is a shame. But this allows me to do what I think is best for
my own ship. I'm not too crazy about someone coming down here
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anyway to tell me how I should run a system that was given to
me already broken."
Most supply department interviewees felt the CSS
procedures to be the most important and reflective of their
daily activities. "Most of the stuff on the checklist, while
important, is certainly not as important as what I do down in
the storerooms. I just make sure I'm covered with the admin
stuff on the checklist and do what I got to do." While happy
on one hand not to be scrutinized too closely, supply officers
were frustrated that the compliance inspections did not look
at their inventory and allowance practices. "I've got over $7
million dollars worth of parts in inventory. Most of this
ship's dollars are spent for spare parts but they only thing
they care about are the small change dollars in commercial
purchases." This statement indicates that even though there
is no indication of poor internal control, supply
representatives still desire some management oversight and
that it be directed at aspects that have a more significant
impact on readiness and sustainability issues.
4. Results
The assumptions of quality-based control mechanisms
are that the desired results can be more readily attained
through process focus, innovation and continuous improvement.
The ability to innovate is encouraged by the system empowering
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its workers to change their processes. The interviews did nor
reveal any information about continuous improvement but they
did highlight an important source of shipboard innovation.
Supply departments felt free to change procedures
locally because of a profound sense of isolation from "the
system." The perceived lack of Headquarters/MLC response to
issues raised at previous supply conferences lead supply
departments to believe, "no one cares as much as I do about my
problems." Aggravating this feeling is the perceived lack of
shore-side support when the ship is on deployment. "The
supply system is good but the Coast Guard's logistic' s system
is bad. There's no follow through. Headquarters does very
little to assist with problems." This sense of isolation
leads the ship to take the actions it believes necessary to
accomplish its mission. If this mentality incurs some
logistical inefficiency, the supply personnel felt that it is
a small price to pay for operational success. "My job is to
get this ship underway. If I have to spend some dollars
outside of proper channels, who cares?"
5. Measure and Evaluate
While many people think that the Coast Guard has been
"doing TQM" all along, they often forget about TQM's strong
reliance on statistical data. None of the shipboard
respondents, and most of the MLC/headquarters staff, reported
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using statistical data in their management functions. When
asked how they know they are doing a good job, policy makers
and shipboard personnel responded, "I tell by the number of
people screaming at me. The fewer, the better." "I go by a
gut feeling. By walking around, watching, observing and
talking to my people, I get an idea of how things are going."
Self-measurement is fundamental to self-control.
Shipboard interviewees revealed a grudging acceptance of this
principle. When asked if they would use statistics, most
agreed that data was important but was too difficult and time
consuming to collect. Shipboard personnel were guick to ward
off any attempt to place yet another demand on their very
scarce time resources. "I don't have time for that stuff.
Besides what do numbers like 94% and 95% mean to me. My
people and I should be able to come up with good solutions
without using detailed statistics."
While most respondents liked the philosophy associated
with TQM, they felt that its processes were counter-
productive. "I hate the hoopla behind TQM. It's only good
basic leadership skills. People are just jumping on the TQM
bandwagon while they should have been doing it all along."
"We have TQM meetings about TQM. Seems pretty silly to me."
"TQM is a good movement, but it's taken on a life of its own
which is unfortunate." "The Coast Guard will never make TQM
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work, because they are only willing to pick some of Deming's
14 points. If TQM is going to be effective, all TQM points
must be used and not just the ones you want." The wide range
of statements indicates that TQM and its processes are an
emotional issue for many people.
6. Feedback
Previous sections have shown how CSS ships increased
innovation in response to their demanding operational
schedules and their feelings of self-control. Each ship
improved its internal system but did not pass on its changes
to other ships or to policy makers. The interviews revealed
that supply personnel did not actively seek the improvements
of others nor did they actively let policy makers know of
their own improvements. "If another supply officer called me,
I would tell him what I am doing. I wouldn't call him first,
though. There's a certain amount of professional pride and I
wouldn't want the other guy to think I was being pushy."
Most supply officers listed two other reasons for this
breakdown in information flow. They stated that a sense of
independence from other vessels and the lack of an informal
"lessons learned" mechanism led to their complacency. Busy
operational schedules and different environmental factors
(personnel, operating areas, and time since FRAM) led supply
officers to think their units were unique. All the supply
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department representatives stated that an informal, non-time
consuming "lessons learned" mechanism would have provided them
an opportunity to share their improvements. "If there was
some way that I could pick up the phone, use E-mail, or even
just write a quick note, I would be inclined to talk about my
ship's improvements. I don't want to draft a formal letter;
have my CO edit it and I don't even want to think about the
benie sug (beneficial suggestion) program." The lack of an
adequate feedback mechanism has limited the diffusion of unit-
level innovativeness throughout the fleet. Systemic learning
is reduced by the inability of shipboard personnel to inform
others of their improvements.
The supply representatives felt that the supply
conferences provided a forum for policy makers to hear their
complaints, but more importantly, it provided them an
opportunity to talk with their contemporaries about various
supply issues. "I liked the conferences. The chance to sit
down in an unhurried environment, just to talk supply stuff,
was pretty good."
The ASPM, representing the areas of headquarter •
s
emphasis, also impacts organizational learning. When
headquarters first published the ASPM, fleet representatives
reviewed it and proposed changes. Since its distribution, the
ASPM has remained largely unchanged. "Ships find the
108
publication change process too formal and time consuming.
Additionally, new people now fill the CSS policy billets."
These new policy makers, charged with ASPM review and rewrite,
have not visited any 378s and are unaware of the fleet's
operating environment. This lack of information can only
hamper the organization's ability to learn and improve.
7. Corrective Action
The interview data did nor support or oppose the
theoretical assertions about TQM and corrective actions. The
CSS environment does not include a systematic method for
process improvement. Ships do not use a FADE process or
statistical collection methods. Any changes made to the
system were made using a "MBWA (Management By Wandering
Around) process. I see things going not as well as they
could, and my guys tell me things to improve the system. We
get together and come up with a better way to do things."
This ad hoc process does not present a view of a Quality
control system. A TQM approach insists that any change, to be
a good change, must be supported by statistical data and not
by "gut feelings." Ad hoc changes may result in greater
wastage and reduced effectiveness.
8. Rewards
The theoretical attribute for the rewards component is
that a TQM control system would provide intrinsic rewards for
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its participants. The interviews support this hypothesis.
Shipboard personnel expressed a great amount of professional
pride in improving their ships despite the adversities of the
CSS environment. Supply representatives pointed out improved
inventory practices, increased sustainability and a profound
sense of accomplishment in making a poorly implemented system
work. "This ship has never missed a sail date due to a supply
problem. While, I don't have the hard data to support this,
I know that my inventory has improved our sustainability while
underway." "None of the other ships can match our inventory
location-verification record." "Our ship has the best SIM
program around." "Our efforts have identified an incredible
shortfall in ordnance parts. Once we get them, the ship will
benefit for a long time to come."
This sense of professionalism, however, also creates
deep frustration. Supply department personnel feel they lack
the ability to change the system and must work around its
weaknesses. "Until I'm told to stop, or until I receive the
tools I need to do this job properly, I will continue to run
my department the way I see fit. That way I know the ship
will get to where it needs to go."
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C. OTHER FINDINGS
We thought it would be interesting to identify what the
fleet considers the supply system's weakest areas. At the end
of each interview, the respondent was asked to identify and
rank three supply areas that needed improvement. In collating
the votes, two items tied for second place. The following
list, therefore, presents the four "winning" problems in order
of priority.
• an integrated, automated supply system that combines
inventory, reguisitioning, usage and status tracking,
property and budgetary reguirements
• an up-to-date, accurate CALMS document reflective of
onboard equipment
• adequate, timely training for everyone involved with the
supply system, including but not limited to supply
department personnel, technicians and command staff
• responsive shore-side support in homeport and at sea
Most of the issues raised were outside the cutter's ability to
resolve. Policy makers are aware of most of these issues and
are seeking long-term solutions to these complicated problems.




What the interviews have revealed is a CSS system that is
driven more by force of personality than by process control
systems. Coast Guard culture encourages this and current
control design does not preclude it. The Coast Guard's
encouragement of personal initiative increases innovation and
learning but decreases efficiency and procedural uniformity.
The interview data indicates limited correlation between
the theoretical attributes of a compliance control system and
the Coast Guard's inspection program. While policy makers
write detailed instructions, fleet personnel tend to treat
them more like guidelines than mandates. The inspection
checklists, however, reinforce the system's focus on end-
products (i.e., documentation) and are used by ships and
inspectors alike to ensure procedural uniformity. The Coast
Guard's inspections lack a serious enforcement mechanism.
Weak personal accountability decreases conformance. The Coast
Guard's program, due to its detection orientation, creates a
time lag between improvements. While ships do not care for
the adversarial nature of inspections they do like the
external evaluation of their shipboard systems.
Internal control mechanisms have met with limited success.
Operational demands and subjective opinions have compelled
supply officers not to comply with otherwise beneficial
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procedures. The lack of inspection oversight, coupled with
high-pressure operational demands, has encouraged supply
department adaptation of CSS procedures and enhanced
supplier/customer relationships. The supply officers' ability
to innovate, however, has reduced overall procedural
uniformity and created logistical inefficiencies. Most
shipboard personnel felt that a Total Quality environment
existed naturally within the confines of their ships' hulls.
The majority willingly accepts the management philosophy but
expresses reluctance to adopt TQM's dependence on meetings and
statistical data.
Feedback between levels of command and between various
vessels is sporadic and informal. Information indicating
needed changes is left at the wrong level. Compliance teams
do not routinely forward their findings to the policy level,
and ships do not request policy changes because of the time
consuming, non-responsive nature of the formal system.
Furthermore, compliance inspections create a feedback delay at
the unit level due to their infrequency. Self-control
mechanisms, on the other hand, have increased feedback at the
unit level due to their enhanced customer/supplier
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relationships. What improvements are made because of this
heightened awareness, though, tend to remain within the
confines of the innovative cutter. Ships are slow to spread
the word about their improvements to other vessels due to
their perceived isolation. In the unlikely event that
improvements are diffused throughout the system, it is on an
informal and infrequent basis. Seemingly, what little
innovation occurs is not because of the system but in spite of
it.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter addresses the research questions posed at the
beginning of the thesis: (1) What are the merits of TQM and
compliance-oriented inspections as control systems for
effective CSS operations?; (2) What is the current state of
compliance inspections aboard CSS cutters?; and (3) How could
TQM support a self-control mechanism aboard CSS vessels?.
Chapters IV and V began our discussion of the merits of
compliance and self-control systems as seen in theory and as
experienced by the fleet. Chapter VI, therefore, focuses on
completing the comparative analysis and responding to the
remaining issues of TQM's possible impact on self-control
capabilities of CSS cutters. The chapter summarizes our
comparison by drawing the diverse information together to
present the strengths and weaknesses associated with each type
of control.
Then, Chapter VI looks at how a Total Quality approach to
control could support CSS operations. The chapter and thesis
concludes with a series of recommendations about current
practices and areas for additional research.
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A. MERITS OF COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED CONTROL
The advantages and disadvantages of compliance inspections
are outlined using the basic components of control as a
framework for discussion. Bureaucratic organizations use
compliance-oriented mechanisms to invest and reinforce their
authority over goal definition, rule standardization and
worker behavior. These actions lead to advantages of
increased efficiency, greater management control over goal
definition, increased behavioral alignment with management's
goals, and increased standardization through top-down
feedback. These advantages are discussed in greater detail in
the following sections.
After considering its strengths, the limitations
associated with compliance inspections are presented. Top
management's complete control over the organization, while
increasing uniformity, does present some problems in planning
and adaptability. The disadvantages of decreased
innovativeness, increased planning inconsistencies and the
lack of continuous improvement are attributable to compliance-
oriented systems.
1. Advantages
Compliance inspections can offer significant
advantages to bureaucratic organizations. Chapters IV and V
showed how these benefits evidence themselves in theory and in
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practice. The foremost benefit an organization can obtain is
increased efficiency in meeting its legal and self-imposed
reguirements. The bureaucratic organization can also hope to
reinforce its hierarchical character through its control
mechanism.
a. Increased Efficiency
Compliance inspections increase efficiency by
ensuring procedures are followed uniformly throughout the
organization. Large organizations that have numerous, complex
processes search for a means to make their sub-units work as
cohesively as possible to the greater good of the entire
organization. Standardization also allows top management to
minimize variance in performance at the sub-unit level. This
procedural uniformity allows top management to feel more
secure about their ability to meet their legal obligations.
The Coast Guard has a large number of diverse
federal regulations for which it is responsible. With
Headquarters establishing and enforcing policy, it can
confidently report to Congress its efficient management of
public resources. Through compliance inspections, the Coast
Guard maintains control over its far-flung units, all which
have multiple regulatory responsibilities. By establishing
well-defined procedures and then ensuring units follow them,
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Coast Guard Headquarters increases its confidence in meeting
its legal requirements.
Centralized supply was implemented by the Coast
Guard, in part, because of wide variations in the management
of cutter inventories. Shipboard storerooms represented to
Headquarters and Congress dollars spent but not actively
managed. Cutter sustainability and readiness issues reflected
the wide variations in the cutters' performances of their
supply support missions. Strict compliance inspections of CSS
cutters would reaffirm Headquarter s control over supply
support issues and decrease fleet-wide deviations from
procedural requirements. The interviews have indicated that
without inspections CSS cutters have shown a tendency to
modify or ignore Headquarter ' s supply policy in favor of their
own agendas.
b. Increased Management Control Over Goal Definition
Compliance inspections reinforce a bureaucracy's
hierarchical structure. As earlier analysis indicates, in a
compliance-oriented regime, policy is the purview of top
management. Once policy is established, top management has a
vested interest in seeing it enforced. In and of itself, the
act of issuing policy reaffirms to the rest of the
organization the preeminence of top management. Likewise, the
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act of inspection reinforces the fact that headquarters is in
control of its subordinate units.
In the case of CSS cutters, the lack of inspections
gave implied consent to the supply departments to revise
management's reform agenda. As different processes were
ignored or modified, the authority of policy makers
diminished. While Headquarters may believe that its published
policies are correcting past mistakes, it lacks consistency of
effort because each field unit is rewriting the ASPM's
procedures to meet local needs. A strict compliance
mechanism, however, would realign such inconsistent activities,
and behaviors, thus reasserting Headquarter • s role in defining
the shape of supply support processes aboard its High
Endurance Cutters.
c. Increased Behavioral Alignment with Goals
Compliance inspections are designed not only to
satisfy legal requirements but also to align personal behavior
with management's goals. The chain-of-command benefits from
inspections through the evaluation of its units and
individuals. Inspection results are used as an indicator of
an individual's or unit's performance. These evaluations
allow the organization to cull out its non-conforming members.
In this manner, the system seeks to safeguard current
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efficiency standards and to improve future efficiencies by
keeping only those members who comply with regulations.
If compliance inspections accurately report the
state of supply department operations, the organization could
easily identify those individuals complying with regulations.
These people would be rewarded with positive marks on their
evaluation reports and their chances for future promotions
would increase. Non-conformists would also be identified and
given negative marks on their evaluations to decrease the
likelihood of future promotion or retention. As described in
Chapter V, shipboard interviewees felt that current
evaluations did not reflect their performances in lieu of
their CSS responsibilities. As such, Headquarters can not use
compliance inspections to motivate certain behaviors to
promote uniformity in CSS procedures.
As the interviews showed, while shipboard personnel
expressed a certain nonchalance about the impact of
inspections on their personal evaluations, their actions
belied their comments. Most individuals wanted to perform
well on the inspection as shown by the ships' work-up periods
before inspections. Headquarters could easily encourage this
type of attention to procedures through a strict enforcement
and reporting process. By controlling and reinforcing desired
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behavior, Headquarters assures itself of meeting its overall
objectives.
d. Top-Down Feedback Increases Standardization
Compliance inspections present an opportunity for
policy makers to restate their requirements for subordinate
units. When inspectors tell errant individuals what policy
states and then show them how to comply with it, the
organization enhances its standardization efforts. Top
management gains increased adherence to its directives, and
individuals gain an understanding of their role within the
organization.
Shipboard personnel see this feedback as a type of
training. It allows them to learn how to work within the
system. Feedback increases the individual's ability to
perform procedures properly and to become better managers.
This management-generated feedback also provides
the organization with significant reductions in fleet training
requirements. Standardization of procedures allow individuals
to move from unit to unit without additional training. If
procedures are uniform, individuals can begin their new job in
a new location without any loss to learning curve
efficiencies. This decrease in organizational training saves
time, effort, and money, and it raises unit operational
readiness. By ensuring procedural uniformity, management
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avoids having to provide additional training to acquaint
members with a large number of different systems.
The interviews showed significant fleer support for
the feedback/ training aspect of inspections. Without
exception, every manager spoke of the benefit to the entire
organization, the ship, and the individual when inspections
concentrated on its training aspects. This training is
nothing more than a reassertion of management-held positions
on policy and procedure. The Coast Guard can increase
procedural uniformity by providing on-site feedback during its
inspections.
2. Disadvantages
Compliance inspections may bring with them significant
disadvantages. While they increase efficiency, they decrease
innovativeness. Also, inspections require top-down
establishment of policy which serves to create inconsistencies
in planning. The detection orientation of inspections leads
to peaks and valleys in performance, which is contradictory to
continuous process improvement recently sought by the Coast
Guard. Finally, the inspection process itself often proves
counter-productive as the organization attempts to meet its
strategic goals.
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a. Uniformity Decreases Innovativeness
As bureaucracies strive to become more efficient,
they tend to standardize as many procedures as possible. This
process reduces innovativeness.
Routinization reduces organizational adaptability for a
number of reasons. First, it precludes innovative acts
from those whose work is routinized. In addition, it
tends to ossify the organization because when there is a
high level of interdependence between various work
routines, changing one means that many others must be
changed as well. Finally, people develop loyalties to
some routines which makes it all the more difficult to
change the routines when necessary. (Bushe, 1989, p. 26)
Compliance inspections institutionalize this process of
standardization. As inspectors identify areas of non-
conformance, they bring the errant unit back in line with
training or with a negative report. As the above guotation
states, such routinization reduces innovation.
In the Coast Guard's case, this assertion proves
out. For those areas that have long been inspected, units
tended to work at a level below the inspection standard.
While people felt they could go beyond the standards if they
wanted to, they rarely did. Time constraints, brought on by
hectic operational schedules and numerous, external demands,
deterred shipboard improvements.
The interview data validates the connection between
innovativeness and inspections. Where inspections were
lacking (e.g., the CSS environment), supply department
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personnel professed a sense of freedom to make changes and
improve the supply system. These changes resulted in
streamlined filing, receipt and inventory procedures.
b. Increased Planning Inconsistencies
As control theory indicates, compliance inspections
are designed to enforce top management's policies. The
knowledge required to define near-perfect policies and
procedures is difficult to obtain. When upper management
presumes to have all the answers, organizations suffer because
of a lack of knowledge.
There are some problems with planning from the top as the
key adaptation mechanism. First, when organizational
members aren't involved in the planning, it creates
resistance to implementation. Planning from the top has
its own inefficiencies in that it does not use the talent
and knowledge of employees who are working at the
boundaries of the organization. (Bushe, 1989, p. 27)
A good example of this lack of worker participation was
brought up during the interviews. The Afloat Supply
Procedures Manual, while originally edited by some of its
users, is considered by many shipboard personnel to be
unresponsive to their needs or operations. The lack of
additional editing or input by shipboard members increased the
feelings of supply representatives that the ASPM was
management's tool and a poor one at that.
The Navy's research into inspections provides
another example of how planning goes awry due to inspections.
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"A particular problem noted (with inspections) was the burden
imposed by the fact that a specific or unique problem at one
command or unit often results in the application of corrective
actions throughout the fleet." (Naval Reserve DET 420, 1992,
p. 16) When top management senses a problem, it may over-
react by imposing new requirements without sufficient evidence
to support such an action. In the Coast Guard's case, supply
procedures reflect this tendency to over-regulate. A couple
of supply examples include letters-to-f ile requirements (i.e.
,
authorized procurement officials) and signature-to-file
requirements (i.e., signatures on certain inventory documents
to maintain individual accountability) . These type of
requirements place an undue, administrative burden on units
and only satisfy the need for determining personal
accountability when problems arise. This need to identify
problems with persons rather than with processes is inherent
to the normative assumptions associated with compliance
inspections. Rigorous planning and strict, procedural
requirements are endemic to a system that does not trust its
workers to perform to a certain standard.
c. Impedes Continuous Improvement
The very existence of compliance inspections goes
against the continuous improvement process advocated by TQM.
When the U.S. Navy compared their own inspection programs
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against their Total Quality Leadership (TQL) initiative, the
report stated
The inspection program is one area that appears to
contradict TQL, notably, Dr. Deming's Point #3, "cease
dependence on mass inspections." This is based on the
precept that quality results from improving the
process rather than from using inspections to identify
defects. (Naval Reserve DET 420, 1992, p. 1)
This product-focus, when coupled with management's sole
control over process correction, deters continuous
improvement.
(1) Detection Causes Time-Late Improvements
Chapter IV shows how compliance inspections
are detection-oriented. Quality assurance does not occur
until after the process has been completed. Since the process
is already finished, inspectors are only able to examine the
process' paper trail. Most compliance inspections are
designed to catch documentation errors rather than policy
problems. Once enough inspections are done, a number of
similar documentation errors may lead to some process
improvement. This time-late correction process implies delay
in improvement is acceptable. Even if inspections were
designed to discover policy flaws, they are infrequent and
would inherently delay improvements.
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Figure 7
shows how improvements occur
when poor procedures go
undetected or unchanged.
Inspections result in leaps
of improvement. "Management
seeks performance improvement
only when a crisis occurs or
when performance has slipped
so low it becomes obvious
something needs to be done."
(Sink, 1989, p. 132)
DON'T FIX WHAT
ISN'T BROKEN




Figure 7 Performance and
Detection-Oriented Control
In the Coast Guard's case, this time delay
may reveal itself on two different levels. At the unit level,
inspections are only conducted on a biennial basis. Ships may
operate incorrectly for two years prior to correction. At the
organizational level, until a significant number of reports
indicate a policy or process failure, procedures are left in
place that are themselves contributory to ineffectiveness.
(2) Reduced Feedback Slows Improvement Cycle
Top management's control over policy also
adds to these cyclic leaps of improvement. "In efficient
organizations, adaptation is driven by strategic changes made
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at the top, and it requires long planning cycles and lead
times." (Bushe, 1989, p. 26)
In this case, Coast Guard Headquarter '
s
control over policy also creates time delays in improvement.
Policy makers are captive to the flow of information about
needed change. They must first hear from the field about a
needed change before beginning their policy review process.
Even then, changes may take longer than the fleet believes is
reasonable. An excellent example is provided in Appendix C in
the form of the supply conference notes. The interviews
indicated frustration in the fleet about management's
perceived lack of action. The interviews also indicated that
process problems are not necessarily reported by inspection
team members. Shipboard personnel, if they feel strongly
about the matter, must deal with a cumbersome feedback
mechanism to alert policy makers about their concerns. Even
if information does make its way to the policy level, the
field's performance continues to decline as Headquarters
deliberates the matter.
3. Current Inspection Program Dysfunctional
While theory tells how an organization can benefit
from a compliance-oriented control system, theoretical results
depend on ideal conditions and responses. By understanding
the current state of inspections aboard CSS cutters (one of
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the research questions) , we are able to judge these
theoretical merits against actual application.
Chapter V presented detailed information on how
compliance inspections are viewed on CSS cutters. For the
most part, compliance inspections do ensure a level of
procedural uniformity; however, this uniformity is encouraged
not by strong enforcement methods but by individual acceptance
of policy guidance. This reliance on individual
professionalism suggests that the Coast Guard's organizational
philosophy is more reflective of the normative assumptions of
self-control than those of compliance inspections.
The lack of strong oversight has created an
environment of selective self-enforcement on board the ships.
For those procedures that are part of the checklist review,
the interviews indicated general compliance with some
selectivity on the part of various commands. For CSS
requirements, which are not covered by current checklists,
there was wholesale modification or rejection of Headquarter
policy. The lack of enforcement, coupled with individual
initiative and a strong desire to accomplish unit missions,
have led to variation in process performance and increased
unit adaptability.
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Our research supports the U.S. Navy's review of their
own inspection program , conducted in light of their Total
Quality Leadership initiative. Figure 8 schematically
represents the Navy's findings. Their research indicates that
inspections have become dysfunctional over time because of
four major factors: culture, process, organization and
training. These four components represent the major defining
issues for their inspection program.
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The Navy's research concludes that inspections have
become dysfunctional and are not in keeping with their
continuous improvement goals.
The area we believe is most important from a management
standpoint is the distortion induced by the inspection
process itself and inspection cycle. The other areas can
generally be fixed, but the periodicity of inspections
inevitably produces the peaks and valleys which are
contrary to the continuous improvement process of TQL and,
in our judgement, represent a fatal flaw in the inspection
process... In the area of Culture: We observed that the
reliance on inspections verges on addiction. You just
have to have one and then another. They certainly impede
not only free communications between superior and
subordinate but also discourage constructive problem
solving. They tend to focus attention on the narrow issue
of passing the inspection rather than the broader goal of
improving performance. .. In the area of Training: All too
often the inspectors lack a balanced perspective and do
not have an adeguate appreciation of the impact their area
has on the commands ability to perform its mission.
(Naval Reserve DET 420, 1992, p. 28-30)
The Navy research recommended a phase-out of compliance
inspections and a slow implementation of management oversight
programs using TQL processes. Our research does not seek to
provide any such recommendation, rather we aim to highlight
the strengths and weaknesses the two different control
philosophies represent.
Our research supports many of the Navy's findings.
The interviews indicated that Coast Guard inspections are
troubled by many of the same cultural, procedural,
organizational and training factors that impact the Navy's
program. The following examples highlight a few of these
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similarities. Cultural: Data supports the connection between
inspections and innovativeness; the stricter the inspection,
the less innovation the organization experiences. Also,
interviews with supply personnel indicated a sense that
inspections were more concerned with inspection criteria vice
mission-related goals. Process: The interviews showed that
compliance inspections tend to look at after-the-fact products
(e.g., documentation) versus actual performance. Furthermore,
the inspection team did not focus on critical, readiness-
related processes. Organization: The work-up periods
experienced prior to inspections creates infrequent, short-
term fixes rather than a continuous improvement cycle. Also,
most of the inspection items are management-driven versus
operationally related. Training: The interviews suggested
that some inspectors were unconcerned with process improvement
and that not all inspectors were capable of providing
insightful training to the commands due to their lack of
experience. Our study, in combination with earlier findings,
clearly indicates that compliance inspections have become




So that our comparison is complete, this section discusses
the merits of self-control processes. It also responds to the
question of how TQM supports self-control. Since the Coast
Guard cutters are not operating a self-control mechanism, the
following sections use other research studies to support our
analysis. Where possible, we use interview data to support
our conclusions.
1. Advantages
A number of advantages accrue to self-control
mechanisms. Self-control increases innovation through
increased worker participation in the system processes. The
ongoing measurements and worker involvement produces a stream
of continuous improvement. Process refinements are cultivated
by a customer focus that leads to improved operations and
increased productivity.
a. Increased Innovativeness
Self-control is based on a philosophy that assumes
people want to perform their very best at all times. This
assumption allows the organization to trust its workers with
the management of its processes. Since workers are closer to
the processes than management, they are in a better position
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to track conformance and determine possible improvements to
the system.
In the case of CSS cutters, we see a self-control
mechanism that has been established by default. The
interviews showed how the cutters experimented with the
various processes found in the Afloat Supply Procedures
Manual. Cutter personnel adapted these procedures to fit
their particular personalities and working environments. Each
ship indicated different areas of process improvement, for
example inventory control, Special Item Management, and
configuration control. Personal initiative and innovativeness
flourish on CSS cutters due, in part, to the absence of formal
inspections.
b. Improved Operations
By identifying external and internal customer
requirements, a Total Quality system improves its processes
and its final products. Chapter III discussed TQA's customer
focus. By empowering workers to control their processes,
beneficiaries up and down the process chain are able to
participate in improving operations.
Coast Guard cutters are in the business of getting
underway. Almost every shipboard person interviewed indicated
that "getting the right part at the right time" was crucial to
successful operations. A Total Quality program of self-
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control would monitor the responsiveness of the supply system
to customer demands.
Responsiveness is the primary measure of effectiveness for
the logistics system. An effective system delivers
required materials to the customer/user within established
time frames... As for the Commanding Officers, a response-
oriented supply system does not interfere with any of
their initiatives or decisions. It gives them and their
staffs an opportunity to direct initiatives and focus
decision-making on resolving operational mission issues
rather than spending time and energy dealing with the
daily problems of a non-responsive supply system. (LMI,
1988, p. 1-5)
As the above quotation indicates, customer-focused operations
allow floating units to direct their efforts toward
operational versus support issues. By monitoring demand usage
and the passage of time from request to delivery, the entire
chain from supplier to customer (item manager to ship) can
benefit. These data allow suppliers and customers to analyze
and improve their requisitioning and delivery systems. The
interviews characterized shipboard operations as improved due
to an increased focus on internal customer demands. While
statistical data is not available, interviewees asserted that
the enhanced supplier/customer relationship improved parts
availability that, in turn, resulted in increased
sustainability.
c. Continuous Process Improvement
Chapter IV shows how self-control mechanisms are
prevention-oriented. Quality assurance occurs at all phases
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of production, especially during the process. The significant
advantage of self-control over compliance inspections is the
continuous monitoring of the system's processes. This type of
control is designed to catch process errors prior to end of
its production cycle. In this way, defective end-products are
avoided and faulty processes are identified and corrected.
Continuous improvement strategies focus on performing
better tomorrow than today. They involve different
management processes and practices, and tend to have a
steeper improvement slope over the long run than step-
function strategies. They require everyone, at all
levels, to be involved in the improvement process. (Sink,
1989, p. 133)
Figure 9 shows how
improvements occur when
inadequate procedures are
detected before the end of
the process. Self-control's
continuous monitoring creates
a flow of information that is
used to provide steady
improvements to the overall
system. When compared to the Figure 9 Performance and"
Continuous Improvement
compliance-associated "great
leap" improvements seen in Figure 7 (page 127) , Figure 9 shows
how self-control is capable of a higher, more constant level
of performance over time.
PERFORMANCE /





Bureaucratic organizations often face a number of
difficulties when adopting a self-control mechanism. A Total
Quality approach is heavily dependent on statistics for
process improvement. This dependence creates problems in data
gathering and in evaluation. Furthermore, a bureaucratic
organization like the Coast Guard faces some difficult issues
when it tries to switch from a hierarchical to a participative
management structure.
a. Problems with Statistics
A number of issues plague an organization that
depends on statistics. Because CSS vessels are not currently
using statistics, they are not experiencing problems with data
collection and evaluation. Nevertheless, those interviewed
stated that they would use them if they were easy to obtain
and to interpret. As the following sections show, when an
organization starts to use statistics, it must be concerned
with methods of collection and evaluation.
(1) Problems in Collection
Establishing appropriate measures of
effectiveness that focus on performance versus interim
products (e.g., paper work) is very difficult. The "who and
how" of data collection are very complex guestions that have
been erroneously answered in the past.
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The deficiencies in output measures include
insufficiencies in the techniques for performance
measurement, problems in the quantity and quality of
routinely collected data, lack of staff capacities and
expertise in productivity measurement, too little
attention to performance measurement, and organizational
constraints such as inconsistent data collection and
analysis methods. (Gortner, 1989, p. 211)
The interviews revealed that shipboard management is
constrained by a lack of training in the collection and
evaluation of measurements and by the lack of adequate,
automated collection devices.
(2) Misuse of Statistics
Even though organizations may go through
great efforts to collect data, they may be making these
efforts for reasons that do not support their goals for
quality improvement.
Although measurements are important, they have some
limitations. Measurements can become ends in themselves.
Another common pitfall is the tendency to over-measure.
The infatuation with academic analytical techniques, the
advent and proliferation of computer technology, and
management's traditional desire to control has led many
companies to overemphasize measurements. Some companies
have gotten so bogged down in analysis and measurements
that they have make little progress with their
productivity and quality efforts. Too much stress on
measurements has also been a cause of worker mistrust and
alienation because in the past management has too often
used measurements to control and punish people. (Metz,
1987, p. 2-6)
The Coast Guard should be clear about the purposes of its data
collection. Self-control mechanisms are not designed to
measure people but processes. Self-control mechanisms,
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however, may be less susceptible than compliance-oriented
systems to data collection and evaluation problems. In a
self-monitoring system, the measuring and evaluation functions
would be carried out by the people involved in the work
itself.
As the quotation also indicates, the Coast
Guard should not gather statistics for the sake of measuring
alone. Statistics must serve the quality goals of the
organization. In this case, the Coast Guard must look for
statistics that measure the performance of its supply system
and not just seek reassurance of the fleet's conformance to
published procedures.
b. Evaluation Problems
Research shows that just because an organization
collects statistics it does not necessarily use them to the
benefit of its quality goals.
There are serious questions about whether evaluation
results are, in fact, well used. There may be controversy
over research design and data interpretation. Other
impediments to both the conduct and use of evaluations
derive from fears of program managers or advocates that
evaluations will result in the loss of autonomy of funds
or program authority. The possibility that evaluations
will be used to justify political support or opposition by
outside groups is another source of tension. (Gortner,
1989, p. 212)
Statistics may not reveal pleasant facts to the data
analyzers. As the quotation states, statistics may threaten
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the organization or some of its sub-units if the data reflects
negatively on the system.
There is always concern about data manipulation.
The old saying is often raised when discussing the use of
statistics to support a certain political stance. "Liars
figure and figures lie." The ability to define measures of
effectiveness and method of collection may lead to certain
distortions in evaluation. Even in a self-control system,
management maintains a heavy influence over the definition of
statistical standards. Policy makers should consult with the
workers involved in the process to avoid unnecessary
measurements and improper evaluations.
c. Bureaucratic Character of Organization
The bureaucratic character of the Coast Guard may
diminish the effectiveness of a self-control mechanism. The
bureaucratic tendency to hold meetings, to reguire reports and
to provide information up-the-chain of command may undermine
the local perspective of self-control. The interviews
indicated some concern that "TQM is just another managerial
fad," and that the "hoopla" associated with it would over-run
the practicality of the program. A major challenge to
bureaucratic organizations shifting to Total Quality is the
power sharing and decision authority that is reguired by
systems engaged in continuous improvement and self-control.
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To the extent that organizational members do not truly believe
this degree of change is being made by those in high
authority, this type of skepticism will interfere with the
success of Total Quality efforts.
d. Forces Resistant to TQM
The ability to implement a self-control mechanism,
after depending on compliance inspections for so long,
requires management to deal with a large number of forces
resistant to change. In a general listing these opposing
forces include "uncertainty, reward systems, work loads,
current paradigm, resource limitations, and threats to
powerful coalitions." (Williams, 1991, p. 74)
A previous study identified specific forces
resistant to the Coast Guard's implementation of TQM.
Dozens of anticipated barriers to TQM have been voiced at
various ODI training courses. The top five perceived
impediments to TQM working in the Coast Guard are listed:
(1) Perception that senior officers really aren't
"participating" in TQM. (2) Who gets the savings from
TQM? The concern here is that when a unit improves
processes and saves money their budget is reduced.
(3) Our Coast Guard culture - the customary way of doing
business is not compatible with the TQM methods.
(4) Stovepipes - the lack of cross-functional awareness of
the Quality philosophy. (5) Unrealistic expectations - a
drive for short term solutions and payoffs with TQM.
(Williams, 1991, p. 92)
The interviews support this previous study's findings.
Chapter V revealed that most interviewees questioned
management's commitment to TQM over the long term. The
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interviews also suggested that the Coast Guard's military
culture when combined with its hierarchical structure may
present obstacles to acceptance of TQM as a viable management
philosophy.
C. OBSERVATIONS
Over the past five chapters of this thesis, we have
confined ourselves to reporting theory and interview data.
The following section allows us to meld our research into a
vision of the future, where the better gualities of both
control systems may be joined to further Coast Guard
interests. Our observations pertain to the present state of
control over CSS functions, TQM in the Coast Guard, and our
vision how the Coast Guard would implement a self-control
system aboard its High Endurance Cutters.
1. CSS and the Present State of Control
The current compliance system does not provide
adequate control over CSS functions. Checklists exclude CSS
procedures and storerooms go unchecked. Policy makers do not
receive feedback about the quality of ASPM processes through
the formal control system but, instead, through infrequent
supply conferences that, to date, have served to increase the
perception that the logistics chain-of-command is unable to
resolve longstanding supply problems.
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It is too early to discuss the MLCs • recently
established CSS teams as an effective control mechanism.
First impressions, however, indicate that these teams will not
provide sufficient control over shipboard processes. These
CSS teams do not have a mission statement that is consistent
with control. Both teams see their primary function as
training. While training may increase awareness of ASPM
requirements, it does not necessarily compel conformance. If
policy makers are looking for standardized performance, these
teams lack enforcement capability and tend to be less
directive because of their training mission. The teams,
however, do increase feedback from ships to policy makers and
may lead to corrections of longstanding problems in the ASPM.
While ships have continued to sail and their missions
have been accomplished, this has mainly been achieved by the
force of personalities aboard the various cutters. The level
of commitment to CSS is a function of the complex interplay
between the command staff and the supply officer and the
assistant supply officer. Most supply officers and their
subordinates have tried to live up to the practices and the
spirit of CSS. It is our feeling, though, that the supply
system is slowly returning to the fragmented, inefficient
structure CSS was designed to correct (e.g., poor inventory
control, off-line requisitioning, and poor configuration
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management) . A system built on force of personality, and not
on stable processes, can not withstand the forces of time:
personnel constantly changing, increasing tempo of operations
and supply rules adapted more and more to local conditions and
local personalities.
We agree with the interviewees who stated that the
most important supply functions are now represented by CSS
procedures. We believe it is in the Coast Guard's best
interests to establish a control mechanism that takes
advantage of the strengths of the studied control systems.
The Coast Guard has spent a lot of time, money and effort
implementing CSS on its ships. It makes good sense to protect
that investment through a well-devised control system.
2. Total Quality in the Coast Guard
As revealed by the research, the disadvantages
inherent to compliance inspections contradict the Coast
Guard's recently established goals of continuous improvement
and increased innovativeness. This leads to us the question
of whether TQM provides the Coast Guard the tools necessary to
establish a control mechanism that can achieve these goals.
The interviews revealed a general acceptance of TQM
philosophy in the fleet. Most statements indicated support
for the normative assumptions associated with self-control.
Processes associated with TQM, however, were often labeled as
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"hoopla." Most shipboard respondents agreed that statistics
would aid them in their management functions, but many felt
that the meetings and associated FADE processes were too time
consuming and unnecessary. This reluctance to utilize TQM
practices requires some consideration on the part of
management when considering TQM implementation at sea. This
aversion may only indicate a lack of training or the lack of
an automated capability to gather the appropriate data.
One of the researchers, a Marine Corps Captain with
over 20 years service, feels compelled to make a personal
observation. After conducting so many interviews, visiting
various Coast Guard commands, and observing the leadership
styles of Coast Guard personnel, this "outsider" feels that
TQM is more likely to succeed in the Coast Guard than in other
service. The Coast Guard's unique culture (born of a public
service mentality) , its small size, and the inter-personal
dynamics between the different ranks allows the Coast Guard to
more easily assimilate the values associated with TQM. The
willing belief that superiors accept the professionalism of
and rely on the initiative of their subordinates indicates
strong support for the normative assumptions associated with
self-control.
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3. Vision of a CSS Cutter's Integrated Control Mechanism
Theory and data have both indicated strong, positive
features to external and internal control systems. Our vision
of a control system aboard a CSS cutter takes notice of these
strengths and incorporates them. Likewise, we attempt to
mitigate the disadvantages associated with the control
systems. Our description of this hybrid system leans heavily
on the Coast Guard's vision of the future as described by its
Logistics Master Plan.
First, organizational philosophy must be supportive of
a self-control environment. The Coast Guard's Logistics
Master Plan speaks to this issue.
Our values will guide our approach to the future:
Honor: honesty, integrity and trust are the backbone of a
sustained quality organization; People: our people are
the source of our strength. They determine our reputation
and vitality. Involvement and teamwork are our core human
values; Quality: Quality comes first. To achieve
customer satisfaction, the quality of our products and
services must be our highest priority. (Commandant, 1992,
p. 2)
The Logistics Master Plan echoes the philosophy of a Total
Quality approach to control. Since this philosophy states
that management depends on and trusts its people, a self-
control mechanism can be established. The importance of these
"core human values" to the control system cannot be
understated. It these values that will determine the
interaction between individuals, sub-units and management.
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The structure of our control mechanism takes shape
around these basic values. The Logistics Master Plan again
provides a general insight into the design of the control
system.
The future Coast Guard logistics system is envisioned to
be integrated, automated, cost effective, efficient and
responsive to its customers, managed by a professional,
well-trained work force and inter-operable with Department
of Defense (DOD) and Other Government Agency (OGA) sources
of logistics support. (Commandant, 1992, p. 2)
This provides us a very broad outline for the self-control
mechanism for CSS cutters.
For those areas that have a specific, legal
requirement for external audits, compliance inspections will
remain. In this way, management assures itself of preventing
waste, fraud and abuse in those areas where the organization
is legally accountable. To enhance process improvement,
feedback reports will be provided to policy makers so that
faulty rules may be identified and rectified as soon as
possible. Inspectors will be officially charged with
identifying, analyzing and reporting system innovations for
possible diffusion to the fleet.
All processes not having a specific, legal requirement
would be monitored and controlled at the unit level. Units
would follow policy and standards outlined by the Afloat
Supply Procedures Manual. Checklists, to be used for internal
management, training and relief procedures, would be provided
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and used by MLC CSS training and assist teams. These
checklists would list broad areas that focus on value-added
processes and alert the ship to procedures designed to enhance
performance. By providing these types of checklists, the
training and learning curve advantages associated with
compliance-oriented control systems are retained.
Procedures, outlined in the ASPM, must include well-
defined standards of performance. These standards would
represent the operational, readiness, responsiveness and
sustainability parameters within which all CSS cutters would
operate. We realize that CSS cutters are dealing with
significant issues left by FRAM, major weapon retrofits, CSS
implementation and demanding Ready-For-Sea and operational
schedules. We think that the first round of MLC CSS assist
visits should be used to establish these baselines of
performance. The CSS assist teams could identify the best-of-
class procedures and levels of performance. These teams could
also assist ships in identifying allowance shortfalls and
enhancing their customer focus by providing relevant SIM data
from other CSS vessels.
All control systems compare performance to desired
results. Self-control demands a constant monitoring
capability over the supply system's processes to minimize the
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variance of actual results from acceptable standards.
Automation would play a significant role in self-measurement
.
Logistics information management systems must be
modernized and merged to facilitate an integrated,
response-oriented Coast Guard logistics system and allow
for inter-operability with DOD logistics networks.
(Commandant, 1992, p. 2)
Computers would automatically collect data as items are
demanded, receipted and issued aboard cutters. Computers
would produce understandable management reports and graphs at
a single key stroke. As interviews indicated, for statistics
to be used aboard ships, collection and analysis must be
relatively easy and painless in the sense that they be made
"sailor-proof" and not time consuming.
Cutter personnel indicated an interest in several
statistical measurements. Command staff (COs and XOs) thought
measurements of readiness and sustainability would offer them
greater management oversight. Statistics dealing with
percentage of allowances and high usage (SIM) parts on board
would give them an indication of mission readiness. In
addition to these statistics, measures of responsiveness,
level of commercial purchase activity vice supply system
requisitions and economic reorder points would be of interest
to supply department representatives.
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Statistics would not be used only by the cutters. A
data link between the ships, the MLCs and the Coast Guard
supply support centers would increase flow of information from
customers and suppliers over a range of issues (e.g., usage
data, configuration reports, allowance verification, and
readiness levels) . This data link would be a "pull-type"
versus a "push-type" system. This unilateral data collection
method permits the ship to continue to perform its primary
missions while allowing the MLCs and supply centers to obtain
raw data necessary to meet oversight and customer/supplier
responsibilities.
Raw data presents a clearer picture to the logistics
chain-of-command because it precludes data contamination and
manipulation. This unrefined data, when aggregated at the MLC
level, would allow MLC and Area commanders to identify
standards of readiness and sustainability for their
subordinate units and to identify needed changes in policies.
Shore support units would aggregate the data to provide
increased support in parts availability and enhanced
configuration management so that shipboard readiness may
increase. This type of "pull" feedback enhances the
customer/supplier relationship without creating additional
administrative burdens for the field unit.
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Self-control at the unit level requires a supporting
structure up the chain-of-command to analyze statistical data
and diffuse process improvements across the fleet. The Coast
Guard's linking structure would provide this level of support.
Shipboard Natural Working Groups would report their
innovations to permanently established, Logistics Quality
Management Boards at the MLCs. Former compliance teams would
act as QMB analysts, reviewing data and watching individual
cutter and aggregated trends. If they identified a disturbing
trend on a certain cutter, the CSS training team could assist
in problem identification and resolution or in process
improvement. These teams could also make annual assist visits
to train and identify any process improvements that had not
been previously reported. This type of linking structure, as
noted in earlier chapters, provides increased feedback,
diffuses unit-level improvements, and increases worker
participation in policy and rule formulation.
D. CONCLUSION
The Coast Guard implemented Centralized Shipboard Supply
to help resolve earlier problems of poor inventory management
and other supply support issues. By instituting CSS,
Headquarters changed shipboard organizations, policies and
procedures. It did not, however, make a commensurate change
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in the supply system's control mechanism. Compliance
inspections have only recently reached the HECs, and even
then, they do not evaluate CSS procedures. TQM's rise as the
management tool-of-choice in the Coast Guard may offer some
suggestions for an improved control system.
This thesis concerns itself with two alternative control
mechanisms, compliance-oriented control and self-control.
Thesis research indicates a balancing connection between
control and organizational efficiency and adaptability. As
organizations attempt to institutionalize one attribute, it is
usually at the expense of the other.
The first alternative, compliance inspections, is an
after-the-fact detection of errors. This type of oversight
rests on normative values of management-employee distrust, a
belief that individuals lack motivation and commitment to the
organization's work. These beliefs lead to a system where
management generates all policies, checks for consistency of
effort and is the only element which may make changes to
existing policies. While this system increases organizational
efficiency through procedural uniformity, it discourages
innovativeness and unit-level adaptability. This type of
system also leads to wasted resources, rule following, and
time-late corrections to the system.
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The Quality Advantage, the Coast Guard's variant of TQM,
offers an alternative of self-control to the external
monitoring of compliance inspections. Self-control mechanisms
are preventive in nature because they use statistical
measurements to review process and product alike. Normative
values of trust and individual motivation are the cornerstones
of TQA. By empowering its workers to improve processes, a
self-control organization increases innovativeness; however,
it must be willing to accept some variance in performance to
nurture this improvement-focused environment. The greatest
challenge to shifting to this type of control system is the
recalcitrant, bureaucratic structure and its reliance on a
contradictory, power-maintaining philosophy.
The Coast Guard's recent commitment to continuous
improvement has led it to accept a management strategy that
seeks to increase innovation while maintaining its regular
structure and its associated culture and philosophy. TQA
requires the Coast Guard to adopt a radically different
philosophy than the one that supports its current compliance
inspection system. To balance these seemingly contradictory
efforts, the Coast Guard has created an overlay organization.
This structure parallels the regular organizational structure
but encourages participative management and the flow of ideas
throughout the organization. This design hopes to increase
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innovation, enhance customer-supplier relationships and
institutionalize successful improvements throughout the
organization. The free-flow of ideas within the parallel
structure is critical to its success. There is some question
whether people can effectively contribute in a parallel
structure and then return to the more restrictive military
environment.
Our vision for integrated control onboard CSS cutters
accommodates these strengths and weaknesses of both internal
and external control systems. Our proffered control mechanism
calls for accepting the normative assumptions associated with
self-control: workers are self-motivated, hard working and
truly interested in bettering the system. By providing the
ability for self-measurement and continuous feedback, the
Coast Guard could institutionalize the individual
characteristic it has historically cultivated and on which it
has depended, personal initiative. By entrusting its CSS
cutters with self-control, the Coast Guard would continually
improve its supply processes, increase innovation, and realize
significant benefits in increased sustainability and
readiness.
Before the Coast Guard can achieve these advantages, it
must come to a conclusion about its management philosophy.
The control systems analyzed by this thesis are based on
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radically different and opposing normative assumptions.
Compliance inspections advocate a "hammer and nail"
philosophy. Accordingly, management uses its authority to
hammer personnel into performing appropriately so that
organizational goals are met. Self-control, on the other
hand, rests on a philosophy of mutual trust and professional
respect. In this environment, workers and management join
forces to meet organizational goals. The thesis has described
the merits of both systems. Any decision between internal and
external control systems is tied to the dilemma posed by their
opposing philosophies. Before it can make its choice, the
Coast Guard must wrestle with the fundamental guestion: "Can
people be trusted to do their jobs without management looking
over their shoulders?"
E . RECOMMENDATIONS
After careful review of literature and supporting
theories, as well as conducting an interview process to
understand the feelings about control systems, we have several
recommendations to make.
• Given the relative strengths and weaknesses of external
and internal control systems and its recent goal of
Quality management and continuous improvement, the Coast
Guard should reconsider its use of compliance-oriented
control mechanisms.
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• The Coast Guard should consider the value added by its
control mechanism to the operational readiness and
sustainability of its fleet.
• The Coast Guard should consider establishing a control
mechanism that integrates the positive features of
compliance mechanisms (e.g., training and checklists) and
self-control (e.g., innovation, self-measurement, and
continuous improvement)
.
• The Coast Guard should investigate means to mitigate
lingering skepticism about TQM as detected during the
interview of shipboard personnel.
The following recommendations list specific implementation
proposals that would enhance feedback mechanisms and establish
self-measurement, thereby increasing innovativeness and
promoting continuous improvement of supply processes.
• Headquarters should establish baseline measurements of
effectiveness (MOEs) for cutter supply operations.
• Measurements should minimally include requisition
responsiveness, inventory location verification, fill rate
(both SIM and mandatory allowance items) , and number of
off-line parts requisitions.
• Headquarters should identify/develop automated
capabilities that gives one-touch management reports and
graphs to improve shipboard management system
• Headquarters should investigate the applicability of DOD
automated supply support programs (i.e. , USMC SASSY system
and USN Snap-II system) to increase connectivity between
cutters and supply support commands.
• Headquarters should institute a "pull-system" of
electronic data transfer so that MLC analysis teams can
identify and assist ships that experience a drop in their
measures of effectiveness.
• An automated system interface between ships and inventory
control points and Headquarter policy makers should be
created to increase flow of communications and to broaden
availability of raw usage data and MOE reports.
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• The Maintenance Logistics Commands should establish
permanent QMBs to analyze logistics problems. These QMBs
should include cutter representation.
• MLCs should become clearing houses for very informal
"lessons learned" inputs. An electronic bulletin board,
telephone calls, and penned letters would increase
information flow and diffuse shipboard innovations
throughout the fleet.
F. FUTURE AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL STUDY
This research poses interesting areas for future study.
While the areas of possible research are broad, our list
remains focused on the Coast Guard and its centralized supply
system.
• Define measures of effectiveness for CSS cutters
• Define a self-measurement program for CSS cutters,
including automated and manual procedures (e.g. , checklist
items)
• Evaluate CSS' effectiveness in improving logistics support
in terms of greater supportability and improved readiness
• Evaluate the Coast Guard's overlay structure's ability to
increase innovativeness by generating a more open,
communicative environment
• Determine the transformational impact of the Coast Guard's
overlay structure on the formal organization's culture
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APPENDIX A - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ASPM - Afloat Supply Procedures Manual
CGQC - Coast Guard Quality Council
CO - Commanding Officer
CSS - Centralized Supply System
ELM - Coast Guard Headquarters, Engineering Logistics
Management Division, Office of Engineering
ESC - Executive Steering Committee
FADE - Focus, Analyze, Develop, Execute; a TQA process
FRAM - Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization
HEC - High Endurance Cutter, also known as a 378
LMI - Logistics Management Institute
MLC - Maintenance Logistics Command
MOE - Measures of Effectiveness
NWG - Natural Working Group
ODI - Organizational Dynamics, Inc.
OER - Officer Evaluation Report
PLS - Parallel Learning Structure
QAT - Quality Action Team
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QMB - Quality Management Board
SIM - Special Item Management
TQA - The Quality Advantage
TQM - Total Quality Management
XO - Executive Officer
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APPENDIX B - INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
I. What are the merits of TQM and compliance inspections as
a means of controlling CSS processes?
A. What is the status of compliance inspections
aboard CSS cutters?
PRIMARY QUESTIONS:
1- Can you describe your last unit inspection?
2- Do you find inspection standards lower, higher or
reflective of your daily routines?
3- Do inspections look at those things you actually do to
accomplish the mission?
4- Overall, do you think inspections help you or hurt you?
Why?
5- Do inspections improve your shipboard processes? In the
short term? In the long term?
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B. What current self-control methods
would be enhanced by TQM?
PRIMARY QUESTIONS:
6- How do you know you are doing a good job?
7- Have you found ways to make the supply system better?
8- Have you passed on your improvements to other ships?
9- What supply systems help you to perform your mission?
10- Are there procedures on your ship that lend themselves to
measuring your logistic goals?
11- What measures of system performance would you like at your
disposal to ease your management function?
INSPECTION'S SECONDARY QUESTIONS:
1- What are the positive aspects of inspections?
2- What are the negative aspects of inspections?
3- How do you evaluate supply system efficiency?
4- How do you evaluate supply system responsiveness?
5- How do you evaluate system economy?
6- When was your last inspection?
7- Who currently benefits from inspections?
8- Philosophically, who should benefit from inspections?
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9- After the inspection, did you remain at the inspection
standard, exceed the standard, or fall back to your pre-
inspection routine?
10- Do inspections require any additional work to prepare for
them? If so, how much? (time frame?)
11- Do major inspection deficiencies need to be reported
outside the unit to ensure they are corrected? Why?
12- Who should receive inspection reports? (Supply Officers?
COs? MLC? HQ? Other Ships?) Why?
13- Do you consider supply standards to be minimum or maximum
performance standards?
14- Should every ship be performing its supply procedures
exactly the same?
15- What areas generally require additional work before an
inspection team shows up?
16- Do you consider these areas important to your basic
mission?
17- Do you consider inspection reports to have a positive or
negative impact on the unit?
SELF-CONTROL'S SECONDARY QUESTIONS:
1- What logistics issues determine a unit's success?
2- How do you contribute to meeting this goal?
3- Does the ASPM provide sufficient guidance?
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4- Are there ASPM requirements that you concentrate more on?
Are there ASPM requirements you know you are not meeting?
If so, what are they?
5- Who do you consider your customers?
6- Can you prioritize your customers?
7- (If yes) What basis allows you to prioritize your
customers?
8- Has the available automation package made your job easier?
9- Do you use any statistics? If so, what are they?
10- If you could have any three wishes to improve the supply
system, what would they be? (Prioritize)
11- Do you use the available automated systems?
SCAMP: Have/not have use/don't use if don't use, Why?
ARMS: Have/not have use/don't use if don't use, Why?
LUFS: Have/not have use/don't use if don't use, Why?
Certified/Not Certified
Bar coding: Have/not have use/don't use if don't use,
Why?
OTHER SYSTEMS: ????
12- How often do you conduct spotcheck inventories?
13- How often do you conduct bulkhead-to-bulkhead inventories?
14- Do you maintain a Special Item Management (SIM) deck?
15- How often do you update SIM? How do you update it?
16- Are your property records up-to-date?
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17- Do you have excess Depot Level Repairable parts in your
storeroom? Dollar value?
18- Has your ship undergone any shipalts, ordalts that would
have affected your inventory? If so, have you purged and
added the different parts associated with the shipalt?
19- What changes would you suggest to improve automation?
2 0- What are your perceptions of TQM?
21- What messages are your superiors sending to you about TQM
in the Coast Guard?
22- How do you find out about improvements to the supply
system?
23- (For MLC, Area, HQ) How do you determine when a policy
change is required?
24- Is there a "lessons learned" communications system that
enables you to improve your supply system?
25- Should there be a "lessons learned" system? Either formal
or informal?
164
APPENDIX C - SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE POINT PAPERS
The following bullets summarize the cutter point papers
submitted for the 1992 Afloat Logistics Workshop. The ships
were asked to identify weak areas in current logistic
programs. This summary is taken from Section V of the
Workshop's Conference Notes. Cutters' concerns include:
• undertrained supply personnel; no coordinated training
strategy (initial and replenishment)
• poorly defined roles of MLCs, field organizations,
Districts in logistics chain
• unclear afloat logistic support policies
• management functions should be separated from maintenance
engineering
• ships need on-going shore support; varies with port and
personalities. Need for standard support policy for all
afloat assets at all ports
• ships use too much time and manpower to fend for
themselves - competes with operational requirements
• hazardous materials and environmental programs either not
standard or not available at all ports
• need for coast-wide standard contracts for handling and
disposing of hazardous material/waste. Possible use of
existing Navy/DOD programs
• too much time and effort wasted in band-aid fixes for
recurring problems
• use of permanent senior enlisted "Logistic Assist Teams"
(LATs) to routinely visit and help with supply "nuts and
bolts," training, augment undermanned supply organizations
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• need executive level training for non-supply personnel in
plain English
• allowance programs such as CALMS, ERPAL not in sync. Look
for one standard afloat system
• afloat systems must be compatible with shore systems
• programs should be piloted before installing afloat.
• provide logistic management support closer to afloat
units.
• empower MLCs to provide more care and feeding of supply
products (CALMS, etc.)
• strategically locate storage facilities
• need review of afloat billet structure/organizations (rate
and ratings)
• need to replace "stove-pipe" computer systems. In
example: LUFS, SCAMP, ARMS, etc., with a more integrated
procurement, management, inventory control, and budget
management system.
• need top-down/cross functional review for identifying
logistic requirements afloat.
• its time to use current technologies: Bar coding, CD ROM.
Costs too much not to.
• materials that are no longer needed aboard are starting to
grow again.
• dockside support functions need to be identified,
resources allocated and clean lines of authority and
responsibilities outlined. Heavy emphasis on follow-up
actions, supply policy and procedural issues, monitoring
of usage data, etc.
• align ELM functions with a focused logistics organization
at MLCs (similar to ENE and MLC(v))
• move non-critical material ashore. Free up space for
critical items afloat. Storage ashore managed by MLCs.
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• need more formalized support by dedicated shore logistics
organization. Too many informal arrangements made by
ships.
• define functions needed for an ashore logistics
organization
• improve/clarify supply officer career path in logistics
• need more continuous, in-depth training for supply
officers
• percentage of time that supply officers work on supply
matters varies from ship to ship. Need for policy
clarification
• need for a standard set of supply manuals to be carried on
board.
• need centralized contracts and management: life raft
inspections, hazardous waste removal, waste oil removal,
rigid hull inflatable boats
• standardization of allowance parts lists and allowance
equipage lists
• design allowance and configuration change programs through
E-mail
• maximize use of afloat supply personnel on QATs or other
development teams. Use of fleet input currently minimal
• increase use of automated supply systems currently used by
USN. Same functional needs as Coast Guard; may be cheaper
and more accessible.
• review the policy of sending complex software directly to
the units for their own installation. Too many computer-
inexperienced people on board. Use proposed Logistics
Assist Team to install and train for new systems. Also
need a Information Status Accounting System to monitor,
control and manage hardware and software, changes, etc.
• ASPM in need of improvement. Too costly not to implement
improvements
• improve credibility and trust in allowance change process
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EPILOGUE
Even though the Coast Guard has recognized a need to gain
continuous improvement and increase its organizational
innovativeness, the current control system still requires
uniformity in CSS activities. This prologue addresses this
need for standardization but cautions the reader about the
limitations associated with compliance-oriented control
mechanisms. Research indicates that external, compliance
control leads to rule-following, decreased innovativeness and
a short-term focus on identifying product defects.
Given that caveat, there are certain steps that should be
taken to enhance the current compliance control system. We
believe that a coordinated effort between the compliance teams
and the new CSS teams can increase standardization, identify
innovations and correct problems in policy and procedure.
We believe that the MLC and CSS teams should coordinate
their ship visits to increase training and feedback. Six
months prior to an inspection visit, the CSS team can conduct
a training/assist visit using the same checklist that the
inspection team uses. The CSS team would increase awareness
of ASPM requirements, assist the ship where needed and
identify those procedures that ships have improved. These
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improvements could be analyzed and recommended for fleet-wide
publication by Headquarter policy makers if acceptable. The
follow-on visit by the inspection team would reinforce
established procedures and make the inspection team the "bad
guys" if enforcement were necessary.
Current compliance checklists should be updated to
include CSS procedures. Our analysis of the ASPM
requirements, presented in checklist format, follows. Our
checklist does not imply an endorsement of the ASPM processes
but represents what the directive currently requires of CSS
cutters. This checklist only covers CSS-specific topics.
Other supply issues, like commercial procurement, property
control and imprest fund management, while addressed by the
ASPM, are already adequately covered by current inspection
programs. As the checklist is used, inspection teams will
identify those procedures that have been changed or ignored by
the fleet. With this in mind, our proposed checklist becomes
a good "straw man" that can be used to improve CSS procedures.
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Publications
1. Have procedures been established for review and validation
of publication requirements. (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3,
Section A-2-b and Section E-19-c)
2. Has the Allowance List for Directives, Publications and
Reports Index (COMDTNOTE 5600) been reviewed and changes
submitted? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section E-19-c)
3. Suggested listing of publications which should be on
automatic distribution for supply:
Publication Subject
COMDTINST M4200.19






Coast Guard Acquisition Procedures
Small Purchase Handbook
Supply and Property Manual
Automated Requisition Management
System (ARMS) User's Manual
Afloat Supply Manual














Operating Facilities of USCG DODAAD
Procurement, Handling and Disposal
of Polychlorinated Biphenyls Manual
Fuel and Petroleum
(Microfiche) DOD Activity Address
Directory
Imprest Fund Manual
NAVSUP Mandatory Turn-in Repairables
CALMS Series
Managing Allowances
1. Are allowance change request properly utilized and
submitted as they occur to update Combined Allowance for
Logistics Maintenance and Support (CALMS)? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 2, Section D-8-a)
2. Are allowance change requests responded to on an interim
basis by the appropriate supply center within 45 Days? (COMDT
MSG 231445Z Oct 90)
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3. Are allowance change requests properly validated and
submitted by supply personnel? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 2,
Sections D-8-g-4 and D-8-h,i,j)
4. Are ERPAL allowance lists and package supply aids complete
when provided to the ship? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 2,
Section D-10-d/e)
5. Is the MLC/District commander advised of any additional
funds required to procure deficiencies generated as a result
of the receipt of a ERPAL? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 2,
Section D-10-F-5)
6. Are the CALMS/ERPAL programs properly administered by the
supply officer? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chap 2 , Section F-2-e-5-a)
Requisitioning
1. When demands are submitted, are dollar criteria exceptions
reviewed and justifications made? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter
3, Section A-l-b)
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2. Are supply personnel submitting requisitions to the sources
of supply via the Automated Requisition Management System
(ARMS) or via the MLC ? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3,
Section A-2-a)
3. Does the requisitioning clerks have the required
publications to purchase supplies and or services? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section A-2-b)
4. Has the cutter set-up requisitioning objectives to minimize
cost? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section B-l-b)
5. Are quarterly requisitioning cycles being used to
synchronize the ordering of material along with the allocation
of funding? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section B-2-b)
6. How does the ship determine its requirements for stockage.
Is the 90 day supply of materials and seasonal fluctuations
considered? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section B-2-c)
7. Does the ship use priority source selection when
requisitioning supplies and services? (e.g. Federal Prison
Industries, Federal Supply Schedules) (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 3, Section A-l-b)
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8. Are "substitute items" or "one way interchangeables" used
properly? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section B-2-e)
9. Does the ship ensure document material numbers are not
duplicated? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3,
Section B-3-m-5-a and Chapter 5 Section A-2-b)
10. Are priority designators consistent with the actual
urgency of need and the ship's assigned FAD? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section B-3-t)
11. Does the ship submit Non-NSN and Part Numbered CASREP
reguisitions directly to source of supply for processing?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section B-5-h/i)
12. Are NMCS/PMCS reguisitions submitted by message unless
transmittal by other means are considered more expeditious by
the reguesting unit? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section
B-5)
13. Is the source of supply providing status to the
reguisitioners within the UMMIPS timeframes? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section C-l-a)
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14. Does the supply department monitor incoming status?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section C-2-g)
15. Are status cards attached to the material outstanding file
copy of the related reguisition? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 3, Section C-2-g)
16. Has the cutter taken appropriate action on follow-ups for
outstanding reguisitions? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3,
Section C-3)
17. Is a review of reguisitions in the material outstanding
file done by priority? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section
A-2-b) COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section C-3-c)
18. What actions are taken to address material shipped by the
supplier but never received by the unit? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 3, Section C-3-c)
19. Are modifications of outstanding reguisitions previously
submitted conducted properly and in a timely manner?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section C-4)
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20. Does the ship request cancellation correctly for those
outstanding requisitions for supplies and services no longer
required? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section C-5)
21. What timeframes are established by the ship concerning
Material Obligation Validation (MOV) for unfilled quantities
on requisitions? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3,
Section C-6-e/f)
22. Have purchases been made using sources other than those
listed citing public exigency as a basis for such purchases
and if so, was the purchase made within the bounds of the
supply officer's purchase authority? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 3, Section A-l-b-3)
Procurement from SERVMART
23. Are SERVMART Shopping List (SSL) properly reviewed and
filed by the supply department? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter
3, Section D-l-e)
24. Are inspections and reconciliations conducted to assure
proper handling of materials received from SERVMART?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section D-2-d)
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25. Are those items considered "controlled property" purchased
at SERVMART properly managed and accounted for? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section D-2-e)
Acquisition of Special Items, Equipment, Supplies and/or
Special Services
26. Are mandatory contracts used by the cutters for fuel,
lubricants and solvents? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3,
Section E-2)
27. Is the supply officer responsible for obtaining fuel and
making all necessary arrangements with supply activities or
contractors? (COMDTINST M4 4 00. 17, Chapter 3 , Section E-2-c-3-b)
28. Are all requirements being met concerning special
circumstances in preparation of contracts for bulk petroleum
products? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section E-2-e-2)
29. Does the ship properly procure paint materials and are
they properly stored? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section
E-5)
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30. Is required safety equipment acquired and properly
accounted for? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section E-8)
31. Does the ship properly process requisitions for compressed
gas and compressed gas cylinders? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter
3, Section E-ll)
32. Has the ship ordered lumber, millwork, plywood or veneer
in excess quantities through direct local commercial sources?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section E-13)
33. Prior to procurement of automated data processing (ADP)
equipment is prior authorization obtained from MLC? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section E-15)
34. Have action agencies responded to an original ROD
submission within 45 days and was the submitter notified when
the ROD was passed to another activity? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 4, Section C-8-e)
35. Is the first follow-up submitted to the action agency 60
days after the original ROD submission and at subsequent 30
day intervals? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-8-e)
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36. If a reply is not received within six months from the
submission of the ROD has the unit closed the ROD record and
requested assistance from the MLC/DC to adjust financial
records and obtain credit? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4,
Section C-8-e)
Mandatory Turn-In Repairables
1. Has the ship established an exchange program for repairable
items? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section G-l-c and
Chapter 5, Section B-5)
2. Does the ship have on file repair prices established by
SICP to compare charges? (COMDTINST M44 00.17, Chapter 3,
Section G-l-e)
3. Does the ship use the correct advice code when repairables
are turned in? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3,
Section G-l-e-2)
4. What is in place for using Navy Repairables? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section G-2-a)
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5. Does the supply officer have on board a listing of ways to
identify those DLR's supported by the Navy owned equipment for
funding requirements? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3,
Section G-2-c)
6. Does the ship have the Navy's Master Repairables Item List
(MRIL) (NAVSUP Publication 4107) on board as a ready reference
to ensure DLR's are properly identified and transferred to
Navy Maintenance Facilities? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3,
Section G-2-C-2)
7. Are fund codes used properly for requisitioning DLR?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section G-2-C-4)
8. For Mandatory Turn-In/Depot Level Repairables which were
requisitioned citing priority designators 06 or higher, was
this properly authorized? (COMDTINST M44 00.17, Chapter 3,
Section G-2-d)
9. Are supply personnel checking the MRIL repair maintenance
code to determine if a DLR should be sent to a repair or a
test facility? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section G-2-f)
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10. Are supply personnel trained to properly identify Field
Level Repairable items using the ML-C and Material Control
Code (MCC)? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section G-2-f-3)
11. For Mandatory Turn-In Repairables (MTR) does the suspense
file have a skeletonized DD-1348-1 filed by work Center Code?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section E-2-g)
Inventory Control Procedures
1. Are NAVSUP 1250-1' s used as an internal control document
for requesting repair parts, general purpose property and
consumables? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section F-2-a)
2. Has an approval signature from the department head
requesting the material been placed on the NAVSUP 1250-1 for
controlled items, services and urgency of need indicator "A"
items? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section F-2-c)
3. Are authorized personnel the only ones drawing material
from stock? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section F-2-c)
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4. Are issue transactions posted in ink to stock records
daily? Are issues which are SIM items posted first? Are issues
being pre-posted? (i.e., posted prior to issue of material)
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section F-5-a)
5. For inventory loss are NAVSUP 1250-1 's properly annotated
and signed by the Supply Officer in Block 30? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section F-5-C-3)
6. If material is used for a maintenance action and was
obtained from other than normal supply sources (e.g. salvage,
cannibalize, local manufacture) was a NAVSUP 1250-1 prepared
by the responsible work center to document and report usage?
(COMDTINST M44 00.17, Chapter 6, Section F-8-a)
Management of Repair Parts and consumables
1. Is a quarterly review accomplished for SIM items designated
as repair parts/consumables? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6,
Section D-2-a-l-b)
2. Has the supply department conducted a verification or
updated manual stock records when a new ML-C arrives?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section D-2-a-l-d)
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3. Is stock replenishment for SIM repair parts and consumables
based on demands using high and low limits? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section D-2-a-l-e)
4. Are two separate files kept for SIM and Non-SIM items?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section D-2-a-l-f)
5. Are items identified as SIM items meeting the two hits in
six months demand usage? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6,
Section D-2-e)
6. Are Mandatory Turn-In Repairables (MTR) items being stocked
as SIM material? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section D-2-f)
7. At the quarterly review are SIM items redesignated as Non-
SIM items and are all entries properly posted to the stock
records? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 3, Section D-2-h)
Stocking Policies
* Repair Parts
8. Does each item stocked on board the vessel have a Stock
Record? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section D-3-a-l)
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9.
Does the cutter have and use an automated inventory
management system? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6,
Section D-3-a-l)
10. Have custodians been appointed for repair parts stocked in
areas other than the supply department? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 6, Section D-3-a-l)
11. Are SIM items stocked to achieve an average endurance
level of 90 days? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6,
Section D-3-a-2)
12. Are Not Carried (NC) items properly verified to ensure
that the item is identified properly and the parent equipment
is supported in CALMS or ERPAL? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 3, Section D-3-a-4)
Consumables
13. Are consumables procured to maintain an average endurance
levels of 90 days for equipment related and 60 days for
nonequipment (general use) consumables? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 6, Section D-3-b)
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14. Does the supply department maintain records of historical
demand to meet consumable requirements? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 6, Section D-3-b)
*Pre-Expended BIN (PEB) Material
15. Has the supply officer and department heads developed a
listing of those items needed as Pre-Expended BIN material.
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section D-3-c)
16. Are Non-SIM and Non-Maintenance related SIM items being
stocked as PEB? (This is not allowed) (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 6, Section D-3-c-l)
17. For those items stocked as PEB does demand frequency show
usage of five or more per month cutter-wide or two or more per
month from the same department or work center? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section D-3-C-2)
18. Does the quantity on hand show only one month stockage of
supplies? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section D-3-C-3)
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19. If the unit price is over $50 for a PEB item has the
Commanding Officer authorized the stockage of these item in
writing? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section D-3-C-4)
20. Are items with assigned storage codes indicating a
requirement for specialized storage (e.g.
,
hazardous/ flammable
items) store as PEB's? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6,
Section D-3-C-8)
21. Are PEB items with pilferage code I, Y and Z retained in
a security cage? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6,
Section D-3-c)
22. Is the range and depth of onboard stock reviewed and is it
meeting the limits established in order for the cutter to meet
its assigned mission? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6,
Section A-2-b)
23. Are items being stocked based on allowance lists and on a
demand basis? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section A-2-e-l)
24. Are items stored in other departments inventoried
quarterly? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section B-l-c-5-f)
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25. Has the ship used the prescribed methods for conducting
inventories? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section B-l-g-3)
Maintenance Assistance Modules (MAM)
26. Has the supply officer maintained a stock record for each
MAM authorized onboard? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6,
Section D-3-d)
27. Are MAM being inventoried semiannually? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section D-3-d)
Excess Stock
28. Has the ship taken every effort to identify and purge
excess repair parts? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section
D-3-e)
Inventory Management Records and Files
1. Do stock records, other than SIM-DTO, show storage
locations and current on hand balances? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 6, Section E-l-a-1)
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2. Do manual stock records contain the minimum data elements?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section E-l-a-2)
Cognizant ICP/Source of Supply
NSN or ACN









Reorder Point/ Stockage Objective
Allowance Quantity
Unit Price
Hazardous Condition Code (if applicable)
Shelf-Life Code (if applicable)
3. When like items are kept on hand are separate stock records
maintained for different condition codes? (COMDTINST M4400.17,


















4. If the ship is using a data base program are weekly backup
copies available for review? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6,
Section E-l-a-5)
5. Are high priority reguisitions seguenced and separated from
routine reguisitions? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6,
Section E-2-a-l)
6. Is the procurement tickler file properly maintained and
file copies kept? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section E-2-
c-1)
7. Is the Historical Demand File properly maintained and
seguenced? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 6, Section E-2-d)
Material Receipts
1. Has appropriate annotations been made on all receipt
documents? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-l)
a. Date the document upon receipt? Yes No
b. Circle the guantity accepted? Yes No
c. Sign the document to indicate receipt? Yes No
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2. Are material inspection and receiving reports (DD-250) for
delivery of materials procured under government contract
properly filed and annotated? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4,
Section C-2)
3. Are the appropriate blocks on the 1348' s and 1348-1'
s
correctly filed out when material is received from the source
of supply and filed properly? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4,
Section C-2-c and d)
4. Are the appropriate blocks on the DD-1149 form completed
properly and filed correctly for future reference. (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-2-e)
5. Are dummy receipt documents used when material is received
without a receipt document? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4,
Section C-2-h)
6. Are up-to-date receipt files complete and on hand for
review? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-3-a)
7. Does the Material Outstanding file contain a copy of all
procurement documents for material or services not yet
received? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-3-b)
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8. Does the material completed file contain a copy of all
procurement documents which have been removed from the
material outstanding file upon receipt or cancellation of
material or services, plus a copy of the applicable receipt
document? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-3-c)
9. Does the cutter have a miscellaneous file for material
received but not ordered by the cutter showing receipt date
and signed by the responsible material custodian? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-3-e)
10. Are all packages from commercial sources opened, inspected
and counted by technically qualified individuals and receipt
documents properly annotated? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4,
Section C-5-b)
11. During the receipt process is it easy to identify who
should receive the material? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4,
Section C-6-a)
12. Are receipt documents signed in ink and legible?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-6-a)
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13. When material is received does the 1348-1 block 10 reflect
the location of where the storekeeper stored the item?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-6-b)
14. When material is received for Direct Turnover (DTO) is the
receiving signature and date obtained on the receipt document?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-6-c)
15. Are priority items separated by the receiving storekeeper
to avoid delays in getting the material to the end-user?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-6-c)
16. Does the ship process Report of Discrepancies (ROD)
Standard Form 3 64 correctly and on time? (COMDTINST M44 00.17,
Chapter 4, Section C-8)
17. As items are received which were ordered (DTO) because of
(NIS) status are they posted to the stock records where-by
usage can be compiled for NIS items? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 4, Section C-10-c)
18. Does controlled material once received get entered on the
general property records with assigned serial numbers?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-10-c-l)
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19. As excess material is received by the supply department
from other departments, does the supply section also receive
either a NAVSUP Form 1250-1 (for serviceable assets) or DD
Form 1577-1 (for unserviceable assets) to properly receipt for
the property? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section C-10-e)
20. Does the ship submit a proper invoice to the paying office
within five working days after certification and acceptance of
goods/services? (COMDTINST M4400 . 17 , Chapter 4 , Section D-l-a)
21. Are appropriate property records for radioactive items
established and available for inspection by the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) or other cognizant
authorities? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section G-2-h)
22. Are safeguards in place to insure that USNRC material is
only transferred to agencies/persons holding a USNRC license
or a foreign nation only when directed by proper authority?
(COMDTINST M4400. 17, Chapter 4, Section G-2-h)
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Temporary Storage Ashore and Storage Onboard Cutters
1. Does the cutter temporarily store shipboard material ashore
for a period in excess of six months without prior approval
from MLC? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section E-l)
2. Has the cutter placed into temp storage any consumable
material, repair parts, tools or other items required to
support a cutter's general purpose property? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section E-l-a)
3. If items are placed in temp storage are they properly
documented, identified and boxed? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 4, Section E-l-b/c)
4. Are issues points and storage areas maintained in an
organized manner? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section E-4
and G-2)
5. Is the property stored in a ready-for-issue condition?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section E-4-b)
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6. Is a stock locator file properly maintained for items
temporarily stored? (COMDTINST M4400 . 17 , Chapter 4,
Section E-4)
7. Are new locations promptly and accurately recorded in
related stock records? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4,
Section E-4-e)
8. Does the ship properly store compressed gas cylinders?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section F-2-d)
9. Has the ship established a shelf life program to properly
identify shelf life stock for effective control and maximum
utilization? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section F-3-k and
Chapter 6, Section B-l-c-5-e)
10. Are shelf life items managed to ensure first in first out
(FIFO) storage is accomplished? (COMDTINST M4400.17,
Chapter 4, Section F-3-k)
11. Is personal gear stored in the supply departments
storerooms without approval from the Commanding Officer?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 4, Section G-l-e)
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Material Turn-ins "DRMO" Procedures
1. When turn-ins are made are DD Forms 1348-1 's used?
(COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 5, Section B-8-a-l)
2. Does the ship use the disposal authority codes to help
expedite turn-ins to DRMO? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 5,
Section B-8-a-2)
3. In the completed document file are copies of the DD Form
1348-ls available for review to account for property no longer
on hand? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 5, Section B-8-b-l)
4
.
Does DRMO provide the cutter with an acknowledge receipt
within the 10 day timeframe? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 5,
Section B-8-b-2-b)
Interservice Support Agreements
1. Are interservice support agreements used to the maximum
extent possible or with economics can be effected without
jeopardizing readiness? (COMDTINST M4400.17, Chapter 1,
Section A-3-c)
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2. Are interservice support agreements reviewed? (COMDTINST
M4400.17, Chapter 1, Section A-3-c)
3. List interservice support agreements in effect:
ORGANIZATION LOCATION SERVICES PROVIDED
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